On "Martin's" Instantial Reference

Bateman (1998: 12):

Two interesting further features of the analyses supported are the recognition of instantial reference [p144], where distinct reference chains may be brought together: ‘but he did not realise that it was his frog’, and some special properties of generic chains where the referring expressions refer to generic rather than specific entities [p103 and p145].

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, unknown to Bateman, Martin's 'instantial reference' is his misunderstanding of Hasan's (1984, 1985) 'instantial semblance', which is a type of lexical cohesion, not grammatical reference.  See A Misleading Analysis Of "Instantial Reference".

[2] To be clear, there is no conjoining of reference chains in the sample text ([3:84]).  Martin's false claim, accepted without question by Bateman, derives from confusing grammatical reference with lexical cohesion.  See A Misleading Analysis Of "Instantial Reference".

[3]  To be clear, Martin (1992: 103) defines the distinction between generic and specific reference distinction as: 

Generic reference is selected when the whole of some experiential class of participants is at stake rather than a specific manifestation of that class …

That is, though Martin labels the distinction as the elaborating relation of delicacy (generic vs specific), the definition confuses part-whole relations ('whole') with token-type relations ('manifestation of a class'), the former, the extending relation of composition, the latter, an elaborating relation of instantiation.  See The Re-Initiation Of Generic Reference Chains.

On The Manifestation Of Reference Chains In Lexicogrammar

Bateman (1998: 12):

The chains are neutral with respect to grammatical structure and semantic reference relations are always indicated (in contrast to Cohesion in English). The manifestation of these chains in the lexicogrammar is generally (i.e., congruently) within closed-class terms within the nominal group.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, leaving aside the fact that, as previously demonstrated, reference chains are not actually structures, Martin's reference chains are said to be the structural realisation of the textual system of IDENTIFICATION, the discourse semantic counterpart of grammatical reference.  Since grammatical reference is not realised structurally, there are no grammatical structures to realise its discourse semantic counterpart.

[2] To be clear, on the one hand, the source of most of Martin's ideas, Cohesion in English (Halliday & Hasan 1976), is concerned with grammatical reference, and on the other hand, reference chains do not feature in their work.  Martin takes the idea of reference chains from the notion of cohesive chains in Hasan (1985/9: 84).

[3] This misrepresents Martin's model.  In terms of the grammar, it is nominal groups that are said to be "phoric" and that are linked in reference chains.  This is because Martin's "reference" is actually ideational denotation ('participant identification'), not textual reference.

Moreover, it is not only "closed-class terms in the nominal group" that "manifest" these chains, since, Martin (1992: 99, 121) includes proper names as 'phoric', and according to Martin (1992: 135):

• the 'realisational domain' of reminding phoricity includes the Thing,
• the 'realisational domain' of relevance phoricity includes the Epithet,
• the 'realisational domain' of redundancy phoricity includes the Epithet, Classifier and Thing,

all of which can be realised by (open set) lexical items.

[4] This gloss of 'generally' misunderstands 'congruently'.  In SFL theory, 'congruence' refers to meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar) being in agreement, as is the case in the absence of ideational or interpersonal grammatical metaphor.

On 'Reminding Phoricity', 'Relevance Phoricity' And 'Bridging'

Bateman (1998: 11-2):

For capturing identification strategies, Martin sets out presumed elements as depending on presuming elements with the direction of dependence marked by an arrow linking the chain elements. ‘Reminding phoricity’ and ‘direct presumption’ are taken as unmarked cases and are not given any special indication, whereas ‘relevance phoricity’ (RL) and ‘bridging’ (BR) are marked as labels on the dependency lines connecting presuming to presumed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] A thought that did not occur to Bateman here is that presuming elements depend on presumed elements only in the sense that a reference item depends on there being a referent to refer to.

[2] A thought that did not occur to Bateman here is that "reminding phoricity" is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) personal and demonstrative co-reference, misunderstood and relocated from non-structural grammar (cohesion) to structural discourse semantics.  See Rebranding Co-Reference As 'Reminding Phoricity'.

[3] A thought that did not occur to Bateman here is that "relevance phoricity" is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) comparative reference, misunderstood and relocated from non-structural grammar (cohesion) to structural discourse semantics.  See Rebranding Comparative Reference As 'Relevance Phoricity'.

[4] A thought that did not occur to Bateman here is that Martin's "bridging" — taken from Havilland and Clark (1974) — is a confusion of two distinct types of cohesion: grammatical reference and lexical cohesion, relocated from non-structural grammar (cohesion) to structural discourse semantic system of IDENTIFICATION — the counterpart of reference.  See Confusing Grammatical Reference And Lexical Cohesion.

On Martin's Use Of The ‘Reticula’ Notation

Bateman (1998: 11):

Such [reference] chains reflect the sequential unfolding of a text; nominal groups related according to some selection of features from the IDENTIFICATION system networks are written in chains vertically down the page. This form of representation Martin derives from the ‘reticula’ notation for discourse analysis developed within the Hartford stratificationalist school (cf. Gleason, 1968).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Following Martin, Bateman here confuses what is purported to be a structure (reference chain) with the process of logogenesis (the unfolding of a text).

[2] One thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that nominal groups are lexicogrammatical form, not discourse semantic functions.  Another is that, in mistaking nominal groups for reference items, Martin's model links the participants the boy and his frog into the same reference chain (1992: 144).

[3] A thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that these reticula were devised to represent ideational meanings.  Martin (1992: 95):

These consisted of events and the connections between them (an event-line) and participants and the roles they play in events.

As previously demonstrated, Martin's model mistakes textual reference for ideational denotation, and so Martin's use of the reticula notation as a representational device is consistent with this misunderstanding.