On Semantic Motifs As Exemplifying "The Boundaries Of Grammatical Description"

Bateman (1998: 3):

The first example of reaching the boundaries of grammatical description that Martin discusses is the existence of ‘semantic motifs’ whose diversification in grammatical realisation goes beyond that which any grammar (even one such as IFG) should reasonably be required to cover. Patterns such as the following [p16] suggest that there are systematic choices available to the linguistic system for manipulating the grammatical potential (and its natural semantics) as it is employed in any text.

(a) Ford is smiling because Trillian arrived.

It pleases Ford that Trillian has arrived.

Ford is happy that Trillian has arrived. 

(b) Ford is frowning because Trillian has left.
It disturbs Ford that Trillian has left.
Ford is unhappy that Trillian has left.

The three sentences of both (a) and (b) range across what IFG describes as ‘behavioural’, ‘mental’, and ‘relational’ type clauses respectively. The grammar places these clause types in opposition: each involves a distinct ‘syndrome’ of grammatical constructions and phenomena and structurally they are quite diverse; here, however, they appear to stand as alternatives for, in some respects, semantically similar messages. Where, Martin asks, is this semantic commonality in apparent grammatical diversity to be located?

Blogger Comments:

What Martin (1992: 16) actually argues is as follows:

Following Halliday (1985), the first clause in each set is behavioural, the second mental and the third relational — fundamentally different process types. At the same time, all three clauses construct a relatively uniform, and not unfamiliar disposition for Ford. One way to generalise across these various realisations of the same disposition is to stratify the content plane, setting up an attitude network realised across process types (with realisations extending into other areas of the grammar as well; for example, adverbial and nominal groups). 

There are two major theoretical confusions here.

1. Martin uses generalisation as a justification for a higher level of symbolic abstraction.  This confuses one dimension of the theory, the scale of delicacy, with a distinct dimension of the theory, the hierarchy of stratification.
2. Martin proposes setting up an attitude network at the level of discourse semantics to be realised by process types at the level of lexicogrammar.  That is, Martin presents an incongruent (metaphorical) inter-stratal relation as a justification for strata in a congruent relation.

Moreover, despite using the notion of 'semantic motifs' as a justification for his discourse semantic stratum, Martin nowhere attempts to set up 'an attitude network realised across process types'.

See also The Problems With Semantic Motifs As A Motivation For Stratification.

On "The Regularities That Grammar Cannot Capture"

Bateman (1998: 3):

Martin therefore takes pains to position English Text as building explicitly on the broadest approach to the functional description of English grammar currently available, i.e., that set out at length in Halliday’s IFG and elaborated further systemically in Matthiessen’s (1995) Lexicogrammatical Cartography. Martin then considers where such an account — already, as he describes in this chapter, somewhat ‘extravagent’ [sic] in the dimensions of organisation that it provides — itself necessarily ‘runs out of steam’ when we turn to the distinctive phenomena of text and discourse. The regularities that grammar cannot capture then provide the point of departure for those regularities that a distinct discourse semantics may be in a better position to describe and explain.

Blogger Comments:

The claim that the grammar "runs out of steam" is Martin's (1992:16):

Extravagant as systemic functional grammars are, they do run out of steam.  Three of their limitations will now be reviewed.

The three "limitations" that Martin identifies then become the justification for his proposed stratum of discourse semantics.  These are:

1. semantic motifs (p16)
2. grammatical metaphor (pp16-7)
3. cohesion (pp17-9)

The first notion, 'semantic motifs', refers to generalisations across some instances of some process types. However, this does not provide support for a higher stratum of symbolic abstraction, because generalisation is not abstraction.  In SFL theory, this type of generalisation is modelled in terms of delicacy.  Martin's 'semantic motifs' is actually an argument for a more general system of process types, not a higher stratum.

It can be noted that Martin, having introduced the notion of 'semantic motifs' as a rationâle for discourse semantics, promptly forgets about it; that is, it is not addressed in his chapter on experiential semantics (termed 'ideation'), or anywhere else. 

For a more detailed critique, see The Problems With Semantic Motifs As A Motivation For Stratification.

The second notion, grammatical metaphor, on the other hand, does provide a justification for a higher level of symbolic abstraction.  However, this merely justifies a semantic stratum, in general, not a specifically discourse semantics.  Looking at the way Martin words his discussion, the reader could be forgiven for thinking that this argument is Martin's insight, and that Martin is the first to propose a stratification of the content plane.  The insight and the proposal were originally, of course, Halliday's.

It can be noted that Martin, in any case, misunderstands the notion of grammatical metaphor, as demonstrated, for this specific discussion, at Misrepresenting Grammatical Metaphor, and more generally throughout the entire publication here.

The third notion, cohesion, refers to the non-structural resources of the textual metafunction on the stratum of lexicogrammar.  Martin's focus is on conjunctive cohesion, and the fact that this, like clause complexing, involves the deployment of expansion relations.  According to Martin (p19), setting up a discourse semantic stratum 'will permit generalisations to be made across structural and non-structural textual relations.

The confusions here are manifold.  Firstly, the argument again confuses generalisation with abstraction, and so does not support the notion of a higher stratum — discourse semantic or otherwise.  Secondly, the generalisation ignores the distinction between metafunctions: textual (conjunction) and logical (clause complexing), and between non-structural (conjunction) and structural (clause complexing) relations.  See also Not Recognising The 'Continuity' Between Clause Taxis And Conjunctive Cohesion.

In the course of his argument, Martin misrepresents Halliday and Hasan's work on cohesion, as demonstrated in the following critiques:

• Misrepresenting Cohesion
• Misrepresenting The Domain Of Cohesion
• Misconstruing 'Cohesion Within The Sentence'

For a summary critique of Martin's three arguments, see Why The Argument For A 'Discourse' Semantic Stratum Is Invalid.