On The Breadth And Systematic Interrelationships In 'English Text'

Bateman (1998: 25): 

One of the difficulties in approaching English Text is at the same time one of the principal reasons for making the effort—that is, its breadth. Work in the complex area of discourse organisation and function typically achieves a fragmentary view at best, focusing in on particular areas and phenomena. English Text goes beyond this, presenting both detail and systematic interrelationships that successfully evoke a feel for the semantics of discourse and its realisation in lexicogrammatical patterns as a complex interacting whole.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading.  Martin's model of discourse semantics is largely confined to the textual metafunction, and only part of that.  This is because Martin's systems of IDENTIFICATION, CONJUNCTION and IDEATION are misunderstandings of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) lexicogrammatical cohesion, rebranded and misrepresented as semantic stratum systems of three different metafunctions.  (The one exception is NEGOTIATION, which is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's interpersonal semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION.)

[2] This is very misleading.  Martin's systems of IDENTIFICATION, CONJUNCTION and IDEATION do not specify how their paradigmatic features are realised syntagmatically, and do not specify how they are realised at the level of lexicogrammar.  Moreover, due to Martin's misunderstanding of theoretical concepts, the model creates mismatches between semantics and lexicogrammar, even in the absence of grammatical metaphor.

[3] Given all the misunderstandings that invalidate Martin's model, it is not true to claim that it evokes even a feeling for such matters successfully.

∞

The arguments that constitute the evidence for all the above claims can be read here.

On The Importance Of Martin's Stratification For Grammatical Metaphor

Bateman (1998: 24): 

Two essential differences between these approaches [cognitive linguistics and mainstream syntax] and that pursued by Martin are, however, the following. First, for Martin both the strata involved contribute ‘meaning’—the lexicogrammar is not a passive, automatic reflex of semantics but itself also contributes meaning as was maintained in the original Firthian tradition out of which systemic-functional linguistics has grown. This is of particular importance when we come to consider the role and function of ‘grammatical metaphor’: i.e., what happens when the semantic and grammatical options taken up are not congruent. For Halliday (and thus Martin) a significant part of the power of language comes from the ability to cross-code grammar and semantics: grammar does not slavishly follow semantics, once a sufficient degree of language use sophistication has been achieved by a language user, the natural meanings of grammar can be used to construct extended semantic configurations: the best discussed example of this being, of course, nominalisation. Here a semantic event is turned into a ‘thing’ that can be modified, counted, compared, tracked across discourse, etc. Adoption of an ‘incongruent’ realisation for a semantic configuration thus necessarily adds further meanings to that configuration, since the incongruent realisation itself has (discourse) semantic consequences. This follows straightforwardly from a basic premise of the approach: i.e., that grammar and semantics stand in a natural relationship; the patterns of grammar are recapitulations of the patterns of semantics (and vice versa).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Unknown to Bateman, Martin's notion that 'all strata make meaning' confuses stratification (all strata) with semogenesis (make meaning); see, for example, Confusing Semogenesis And Stratification or Misconstruing Stratification.  This is one of the contributing factors to Martin locating (varieties of) language, register and genre, in context.  Moreover, lexicogrammar is neither 'active' nor 'passive' with regard to semantics; the two strata are two perspectives on the same phenomenon, linguistic content, at different levels of symbolic abstraction.  That is why the relation between them is one of intensive symbolic identity (realisation).

[2] To be clear, Martin's discourse semantics undermines the notion of grammatical metaphor by not providing congruent realisations of its systems by which metaphorical realisations can be recognised as incongruent.  Moreover Martin creates mismatches between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar — e.g. conjunctive relations — even in the absence of metaphor.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor does not involve using the grammar to construct 'extended semantic configurations'.  On the contrary, in ideational metaphor, for example, an 'extended semantic configuration' such a sequence is realised more compactly as a clause instead of a clause complex.

[4] To be clear, Martin does not understand grammatical metaphor (evidence here) and his meagre discussion of it is largely confined to nominalisation.

[5] This misunderstands grammatical metaphor.  The reason grammatical metaphor 'adds further meanings' is that it is the junction or fusion of the meanings of both the congruent and incongruent realisations; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 243-4, 272, 278, 283, 287).  Any discourse semantic "consequences" are a separate matter.

[6] To be clear, this is Halliday, not Martin.

[7] To be clear, in SFL theory, the patterns of grammar and semantics are patterns of instantiation during logogenesis, and the relation between them is realisation, not "recapitulation" (restatement, reiteration, repetition etc.). Here Bateman echoes Martin's confusion between instantiation (patterns) and syntagmatic relations (structural or cohesive).  See, for example, Confusing Instantiation With The Syntagmatic Axis.

On The Theoretical Value Of Martin's Stratification Of The Content Plane

Bateman (1998: 23-4):

The availability of the two strata, lexicogrammar and discourse semantics, is presented as beneficial in most areas that Martin addresses. The value of stratification, and of allowing the description to range across two (or more) strata, is argued in all of the areas that Martin addresses in English Text. The ability to distinguish systematically between a semantic unit and a range of possible grammatical units or patterns of such units is of fundamental importance—particularly given the very richly elaborated view of grammar assumed. Opening up the realisational relation between a semantic description and a grammatical description significantly empowers grammatical metaphor as an explanatory device.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading to the extent that it gives the false impression that the stratification of the content plane into lexicogrammar and semantics is Martin's proposal rather than Halliday's (whose considerably prior notion of grammatical metaphor depends on such a stratification).

[2] To be clear, Martin argues for the value of his stratification because it allows him to create his own "module" within SFL theory by rebranding his misunderstandings of others' work as his own systems:

• negotiation is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's speech function;
• identification is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's grammatical reference (and ellipsis-&-substitution);
• conjunction is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's grammatical conjunction; and
• ideation is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's lexical cohesion.

Martin's argument for stratification, however, presented in Chapter 1, does not survive close scrutiny; see, for example, Why The Argument For A 'Discourse' Semantic Stratum Is Invalid.

In brief, Martin provides three motivations for his stratification:

• semantic motifs
• grammatical metaphor
• cohesion

Of the three, only grammatical metaphor motivates a distinct semantic stratum, but this is Halliday's argument, not Martin's, and it does not motivate a specifically discourse semantics. Moreover, Martin misunderstands grammatical metaphor (evidence here), and reinterprets it as a process, a "texturing interface" (p401) between his discourse semantic systems and lexicogrammar (ellipsis-&substitution, Theme and collocation), thereby undermining his own argument for it as a motivation for stratification.

Of semantic motifs, Martin proposes (p16) setting up an attitude network to generalise what he sees as commonalities between some mental, behavioural and relational clauses.  For some of the misunderstandings involved, see The Problems With Semantic Motifs As A Motivation For Stratification.  Even so, no mention of semantic motifs is made beyond Chapter 1, and Martin's experiential system, ideation, does not address the points he raises — which is hardly surprising, given that it is a rebranding of a textual grammatical system, lexical cohesion.

Regarding cohesion as a motivation for stratification, Martin's argument involves misrepresenting the source of his ideas: Halliday & Hasan's (1976) model of cohesion.  See, for example:

• Misrepresenting Cohesion
• Misrepresenting The Domain Of Cohesion
• Misconstruing 'Cohesion Within The Sentence'
• Not Recognising The 'Continuity' Between Clause Taxis And Conjunctive Cohesion

[3] To be clear, Martin's discourse semantic units are:

• exchange and move (interpersonal system of negotiation)
• participant (textual system of identification — i.e. rebranded cohesive reference etc.)
• message (logical system of conjunction — i.e. rebranded cohesive conjunction), and
• message part (experiential system of ideation — i.e. rebranded lexical cohesion).

The problems here are with Martin's rebranding of cohesive systems. Most importantly, because Martin treats these non-structural systems as structural, the units he proposes are not units with internal structure, but units that relate to other units. This creates an inconsistency in the meaning of unit, since all other units in SFL theory are units with internal structure. So these discourse semantic units are not units in the same sense as lexicogrammatical units, such as clause, phrase and group.

Martin's naming of units further reveals his theoretical misunderstandings.  For example, the use of an experiential category, participant, for a textual system, identification, is consistent with his misunderstanding of textual reference with ideational denotation, as explained elsewhere on this blog.  On the other hand, Martin's use of textual categories, message and message part, for ideational systems, conjunction and ideation, is inconsistent with his own theorising, but (metafunctionally) consistent with the source of his ideas, the textual systems of cohesive conjunction and lexical cohesion.  Moreover, in naming the two message and message part, Martin misrepresents a relation of interdependency as one of composition (whole-part).

[4] This is very misleading indeed.  Firstly, as already mentioned, Martin does not understand grammatical metaphor (evidence here).  Secondly, Martin does not open up "the realisational relation between a semantic description and a grammatical description" since he provides no realisation statements that relate his discourse semantic systems to lexicogrammatical systems. Thirdly, because Martin does not specify congruent lexicogrammatical realisations of his discourse semantic systems, he provides no means of identifying congruent vs metaphorical realisations using his model.  That is, if anything, Martin's model undermines grammatical metaphor rather than "empowering" it — the direct opposite of Bateman's claim.

Misrepresenting Fries On Method Of Development

Bateman (1998: 20):

Several examples of this kind of integration and its contribution to textuality are given. In general, the resource of grammatical metaphor is used to ensure that textually appropriate meanings are placed in lexicogrammatically supportive positions. Thus, in order to obtain desired unmarked Theme selections, it may be necessary to select grammatically incongruent realisations for the messages to be expressed so that the participant to become Theme may also legitimately be Subject [p435]. And, in turn, the requirement that particular Themes be selected as marked or unmarked comes from the discourse semantic motivation of achieving a particular method of development as investigated predominantly by Fries (e.g., 1983).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, all of this is Martin reporting Fries (1981), not Martin, and it only applies to method of development — not to cohesive harmony, modal responsibility or point.

[2] This is misleading. Fries' work (1981) on method of development, is couched theoretically consistently, that is: in terms of lexicogrammar, not in terms of Martin's discourse semantics, and "motivations" for Theme selection are textual, not discourse semantic.  This latter misunderstanding confuses metafunction with stratum.

On Martin's Notion Of Congruent And Incongruent Lexical Items

Bateman (1998: 19):

Also considered in this chapter are how particular message parts, although they serve as the semantic expression of particular field-stratum ‘participants’, may or may not be realised by single lexical items (congruent and noncongruent realisations): e.g. ‘champion’ and ‘tournament winner’ — again suggesting some of the value of maintaining stratification and providing one important difference with Hasan’s own extension of the position in Halliday and Hasan (1976): cohesive harmony [p372].

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'message part' is Martin's unit of IDEATION, described (p293) as 'the discourse semantic unit underlying lexical item'.  Martin's claim is that it is congruently realised as one lexical item and incongruently realised as more than one lexical item.  This means, in terms of SFL theory, champion would be a non-metaphorical realisation, whereas tournament winner would be a metaphorical realisation.  (A genuine example of lexical metaphor would be construing the champion as a 'dynamo'.)  For further evidence that Martin does not understand (in)congruence, see here; for further evidence that Martin does not understand lexicogrammatical metaphor, see here.

[2] To be clear, the semantic expression of a "field stratum participant" is meaning that realises one of the speakers producing a text — but this is not what Martin means.  As previously explained, Martin confuses field (context) with the ideational meaning that realises it (semantics), and confuses context (the culture as semiotic system) with register (a sub-potential of language).  The theoretical inconsistencies are thus in terms of stratification and instantiation.

[3] To be clear, it wasn't Martin who stratified the content plane, but Halliday, though the naïve reader could be forgiven for thinking it was Martin's idea, given his presentation (e.g. pp14-21).  As demonstrated by the misunderstandings identified above in [1], the "in/congruent" realisations of Martin's 'message part' do not demonstrate "the value of maintaining stratification".

[4] Here Bateman is merely parroting Martin's claims (p372) without question.  To be clear, Hasan's (1985: 94) cohesive harmony is concerned with the harmony between the 'outputs' of two metafunctions, the textual and the experiential, at the level of lexicogrammar:

The output of the textual function are the chains and the interactions; the outputs of the experiential function at the rank of clause and group is what the interaction is built upon. Thus cohesive harmony is an account of how the two functions find their expression in one significant whole.

That is, where Hasan's model is concerned with harmony between the textual and experiential metafunctions, Martin's model, in rebranding lexical cohesion as an experiential system, is concerned with confusing the textual and experiential metafunctions.

For more details on Martin's misunderstandings of cohesive harmony, see the clarifying critiques here.

On Misunderstood Expansion Relations

Bateman (1998: 14-5):

Individual conjunctive relations are described by a selection of features from the appropriate discourse semantic network of this region and the corresponding discourse structure is shown using an extended form of the ‘reference chain’ notation developed in the preceding chapter. Additional requirements for representing conjunctive relations, however, are that scoping plays an important role — i.e., a given conjunctive relation can relate groups of messages—and that both internal and external relations may hold simultaneously. How these are captured is shown in the following example of the notation Martin proposes [p237; ex. 4.187].

(j) a. Ben was unlucky.
    b. He had to take steroids for his injured hamstring
    c. and then they introduced more sophisticated tests.

As with reference chains, the particular relationships at issue are drawn from the labels defined in the conjunctive relation system networks, and these are written alongside the linking dependency relation. In addition, internal conjunctive relations are written to the left of the list of messages, and external relations are written to the right. Therefore this Conjunctive Relation ‘reticulum’ shows that the ‘internal cause’ of message (j.a) is both (j.b) and (j.c), while these latter messages are also related both by external (temporal) ‘succession’ and by ‘addition’. The reticulum also states whether the relations are realised explicitly in the text or not; thus the succession and addition relations are explicitly present (then and and respectively in (j.c)), while the cause relation is not explicitly present.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, the cohesive conjunction relation between the clause simplex (j.a) and the following clause complex (j.b, j.c) is not implicit cause, but implicit elaboration.  The elaborating relation can be demonstrated by making the implicit relation explicit, as in:

• Ben was unlucky. For instance, he had to take steroids for his injured hamstring and then they introduced more sophisticated tests (elaboration: apposition: exemplifying);
• Ben was unlucky. In particular, he had to take steroids for his injured hamstring and then they introduced more sophisticated tests (elaboration: clarification: particularising);
• Ben was unlucky. In short, he had to take steroids for his injured hamstring and then they introduced more sophisticated tests (elaboration: clarification: summative).

Conversely, a causal interpretation can be falsified by making a causal relation explicit, as in:

• Ben was unlucky. Therefore, he had to take steroids for his injured hamstring and then they introduced more sophisticated tests (cause);
• Ben was unlucky. In consequence, he had to take steroids for his injured hamstring and then they introduced more sophisticated tests (cause: result);
• Ben was unlucky. For that reason, he had to take steroids for his injured hamstring and then they introduced more sophisticated tests (cause: reason).

As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 622) advise:

It is perhaps as well, therefore, to be cautious in assigning implicit conjunction in the interpretation of a text.

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, the structural relation between clause (j.b) and clause (j.c) is not temporal succession and addition, but paratactic temporal enhancement.  That is, Martin mistakes a tactic relation (parataxis, marked by and) for a logico-semantic relation (addition).

∞

Misunderstandings and misapplications of expansion, like those above, occur throughout Martin's chapter on logical relations, as demonstrated in detail here.  The effect of such misunderstandings is to create incongruent relations between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar, even in the absence of grammatical metaphor.

On The Logic Of English Text

Bateman (1998: 12-3):

Chapter 4 [pp159--270] turns to develop the ‘logic’ of English Text in terms of CONJUNCTION and CONTINUITY. This is the resource by which semantic messages are combined into larger complex messages, and through which messages are related to previously expressed messages as a text or dialogue unfolds. This is a rich and complex component of the discourse semantics and is essential for any adequate analysis of how texts ‘hang together’. System network classifications are given corresponding to all the major areas of ‘conjunctive cohesion’ discussed by Halliday and Hasan (1976), including subregions of addition, comparison, temporality and consequence, as well as further areas of CONTINUITY.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, "Martin's" CONJUNCTION and CONTINUITY are Halliday & Hasan's (1976) cohesive CONJUNCTION and CONTINUITY relocated from (non-structural) textual lexicogrammar to Martin's (structural) logical discourse semantics.  The theoretical inconsistencies created are thus both metafunctional and stratal.

[2] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that, though he has described a resource of the textual metafunction (relations between messages), Martin's model rebrands his relocation of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) model as a resource of the logical metafunction. 

[3] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that this "rich and complex" resource was theorised by Halliday & Hasan (1976) as a component of the lexicogrammar.

[4] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin's model is not theorised in terms of the three most general types of expansion: elaboration, extension and enhancement (Halliday 1985).  This creates mismatches between discourse semantic and grammatical descriptions, such that relations between the two are incongruent, without being metaphorical.

[5] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin's CONTINUITY mistakes

• mood Adjuncts of temporality for continuity items,
• mood Adjuncts of intensity for continuity items,
• substitution for continuity,
• circumstantial Adjuncts for continuity items.

For the detailed arguments on which all of the above assessments are made, see the clarifications and critiques here.

On The Manifestation Of Reference Chains In Lexicogrammar

Bateman (1998: 12):

The chains are neutral with respect to grammatical structure and semantic reference relations are always indicated (in contrast to Cohesion in English). The manifestation of these chains in the lexicogrammar is generally (i.e., congruently) within closed-class terms within the nominal group.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, leaving aside the fact that, as previously demonstrated, reference chains are not actually structures, Martin's reference chains are said to be the structural realisation of the textual system of IDENTIFICATION, the discourse semantic counterpart of grammatical reference.  Since grammatical reference is not realised structurally, there are no grammatical structures to realise its discourse semantic counterpart.

[2] To be clear, on the one hand, the source of most of Martin's ideas, Cohesion in English (Halliday & Hasan 1976), is concerned with grammatical reference, and on the other hand, reference chains do not feature in their work.  Martin takes the idea of reference chains from the notion of cohesive chains in Hasan (1985/9: 84).

[3] This misrepresents Martin's model.  In terms of the grammar, it is nominal groups that are said to be "phoric" and that are linked in reference chains.  This is because Martin's "reference" is actually ideational denotation ('participant identification'), not textual reference.

Moreover, it is not only "closed-class terms in the nominal group" that "manifest" these chains, since, Martin (1992: 99, 121) includes proper names as 'phoric', and according to Martin (1992: 135):

• the 'realisational domain' of reminding phoricity includes the Thing,
• the 'realisational domain' of relevance phoricity includes the Epithet,
• the 'realisational domain' of redundancy phoricity includes the Epithet, Classifier and Thing,

all of which can be realised by (open set) lexical items.

[4] This gloss of 'generally' misunderstands 'congruently'.  In SFL theory, 'congruence' refers to meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar) being in agreement, as is the case in the absence of ideational or interpersonal grammatical metaphor.

On "Non-Referential" Nominal Groups

Bateman (1998: 11): 

Illustrations of these non-referential nominal groups include structural it, idioms, negation, and realisations for a range of grammatical functions such as Attribute, Range, Extent, and possessive Deictics.  There are also cases that Martin describes as “taking a single participant and splitting it in two’’ [p133], e.g., the top of the mountain where some facet of the whole is focused upon. The table on p134 sets out an overview of these kinds of incongruences in terms of the mismatch in participants and grammatical units.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's "non-referential nominal groups" are said to be 'non-referential' in the sense of not (ideationally) denoting meanings transcendent of semiotic systems.  In SFL theory, nominal groups do not (textually) refer, and the reference items within them, and within adverbial groups, do not function as such as structural elements of the group.

[2] See Martin's misunderstandings on structural it here.

[3] See Martin's misunderstandings on idioms here.

[4] See Martin's misunderstandings on negation here.

[5] See Martin's misunderstandings on Attribute here.

[6] See Martin's misunderstandings on Range here and here.

[7] See Martin's misunderstandings on Extent here.

[8] See Martin's misunderstandings on possessive Deictics here.

[9] See Martin's misunderstandings on Facet expressions here and here.

[10] See the critique of the table here.

[11] To be clear, in SFL theory, the term 'incongruence' refers to grammatical metaphor (where wordings are not congruent with meanings).  Grammatical metaphor is a genuine motivation for the stratal distinction between meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar).  However, Martin's examples are not cases of grammatical metaphor, if only because there are no congruent realisations with which to contrast them.  Moreover, if they had been cases of grammatical metaphor, Martin's argument would involve using ideational metaphor to justify a stratification of textual systems (discourse semantic IDENTIFICATION vs lexicogrammatical reference).

On Martin's Argument For "Stratifying Identification With Respect To Nominal Group Structure"

Bateman (1998: 11): 

These phenomena generally revolve again around cases of noncongruent relationships between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar. This was one of the general motivations for stratifying lexicogrammar and discourse semantics given in Chapter 1. ‘Noncongruent’ realisations involve Halliday’s notion of grammatical metaphor, whereby the lexicogrammar ‘repackages’ the information it expresses in diverse ways, as “variation in the expression of a given meaning’’ (IFG: p342). Applying this to IDENTIFICATION meanings, then, Martin claims [p129] that while all participants (semantic) are realised through nominal groups, it is not the case that all nominal groups realise participants.

Blogger Comments:

Here Bateman is reporting on Martin's theoretical justifications for stratifying his discourse semantic system of the textual metafunction, IDENTIFICATION, "with respect to nominal group structure".  Here are some of the thoughts that didn't occur to Bateman:

1. In order to demonstrate that the system of IDENTIFICATION is located on a higher stratum than the system of reference, Martin is looking at what he claims to be noncongruent (metaphorical) relations between units: between the proposed unstructured unit of IDENTIFICATION, the participant — the entry condition of IDENTIFICATION system Martin (1992: 129) — and the syntagmatic structure of a unit of form on the grammatical rank scale, the nominal group; and this despite the fact that the system of reference is not realised by any structure, let alone that of the nominal group.
2. Although purporting to be providing examples of incongruent (metaphorical) realisations of participants, Martin instead provides examples of mismatches between participants and nominal groups, which, if true, would be categorical, not metaphorical.
3. In purporting to provide examples of incongruent relations between participants and nominal groups, Martin, if correct, would be providing examples of ideational metaphor.  That is, Martin is purporting to use ideational metaphor to justify a stratal relation between systems of the textual metafunction (Martin glosses IDENTIFICATION as 'reference as semantic choice').  As previously explained, Martin's notion of 'participant' results from confusing the referent ('the participant tracked') with the system of referral.

On Martin's 'Incongruence'

Bateman (1998: 9):

Martin also suggests problems with Ventola’s definition of move complexes as being realised as paratactic clause complexes and instead relies on a stratal mismatch (incongruency) to allow a discourse move that can be realised congruently by a single full clause, but incongruently as a sequence of clauses or even sentences related conjunctively (cf. Chapter 4).

Blogger Comments:

There are two thoughts that did not occur to Bateman here, both of theoretical importance:

1. Martin (pp58-9) confuses congruence with unmarkedness, as explained at Confusing Unmarkedness And Congruence.
2. In proposing such incongruent relations between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar, Martin is unwittingly proposing that such realisations are metaphorical — a claim that he does not make (and could not be maintained in a manner consistent with theory).

On Grammatical Metaphor As Exemplifying "The Boundaries Of Grammatical Description"

Bateman (1998: 3):

Similar arguments are brought with respect to Halliday’s notion of ‘grammatical metaphor’ (cf. IFG: Chapter 10) as well as Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) standard work Cohesion in English.

Blogger Comments:

There are three serious shortcomings in Martin's argument that Bateman does not address here (or elsewhere).

1. Halliday's model of grammatical metaphor presupposes two levels of symbolic abstraction on the content plane, and is the main reason Halliday gives for stratifying content into semantics (meaning) and lexicogrammar (wording); see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237).  That is, the argument is not Martin's, and it does not justify a specifically discourse semantics.
2. Martin's argument uses misunderstandings of grammatical metaphor; see Misrepresenting Grammatical Metaphor.
3. Having raised grammatical metaphor as a motivation for a discourse semantic stratum, Martin does not go on to provide the congruent relations between strata by which to distinguish metaphorical (incongruent) relations.

On "The Regularities That Grammar Cannot Capture"

Bateman (1998: 3):

Martin therefore takes pains to position English Text as building explicitly on the broadest approach to the functional description of English grammar currently available, i.e., that set out at length in Halliday’s IFG and elaborated further systemically in Matthiessen’s (1995) Lexicogrammatical Cartography. Martin then considers where such an account — already, as he describes in this chapter, somewhat ‘extravagent’ [sic] in the dimensions of organisation that it provides — itself necessarily ‘runs out of steam’ when we turn to the distinctive phenomena of text and discourse. The regularities that grammar cannot capture then provide the point of departure for those regularities that a distinct discourse semantics may be in a better position to describe and explain.

Blogger Comments:

The claim that the grammar "runs out of steam" is Martin's (1992:16):

Extravagant as systemic functional grammars are, they do run out of steam.  Three of their limitations will now be reviewed.

The three "limitations" that Martin identifies then become the justification for his proposed stratum of discourse semantics.  These are:

1. semantic motifs (p16)
2. grammatical metaphor (pp16-7)
3. cohesion (pp17-9)

The first notion, 'semantic motifs', refers to generalisations across some instances of some process types. However, this does not provide support for a higher stratum of symbolic abstraction, because generalisation is not abstraction.  In SFL theory, this type of generalisation is modelled in terms of delicacy.  Martin's 'semantic motifs' is actually an argument for a more general system of process types, not a higher stratum.

It can be noted that Martin, having introduced the notion of 'semantic motifs' as a rationâle for discourse semantics, promptly forgets about it; that is, it is not addressed in his chapter on experiential semantics (termed 'ideation'), or anywhere else. 

For a more detailed critique, see The Problems With Semantic Motifs As A Motivation For Stratification.

The second notion, grammatical metaphor, on the other hand, does provide a justification for a higher level of symbolic abstraction.  However, this merely justifies a semantic stratum, in general, not a specifically discourse semantics.  Looking at the way Martin words his discussion, the reader could be forgiven for thinking that this argument is Martin's insight, and that Martin is the first to propose a stratification of the content plane.  The insight and the proposal were originally, of course, Halliday's.

It can be noted that Martin, in any case, misunderstands the notion of grammatical metaphor, as demonstrated, for this specific discussion, at Misrepresenting Grammatical Metaphor, and more generally throughout the entire publication here.

The third notion, cohesion, refers to the non-structural resources of the textual metafunction on the stratum of lexicogrammar.  Martin's focus is on conjunctive cohesion, and the fact that this, like clause complexing, involves the deployment of expansion relations.  According to Martin (p19), setting up a discourse semantic stratum 'will permit generalisations to be made across structural and non-structural textual relations.

The confusions here are manifold.  Firstly, the argument again confuses generalisation with abstraction, and so does not support the notion of a higher stratum — discourse semantic or otherwise.  Secondly, the generalisation ignores the distinction between metafunctions: textual (conjunction) and logical (clause complexing), and between non-structural (conjunction) and structural (clause complexing) relations.  See also Not Recognising The 'Continuity' Between Clause Taxis And Conjunctive Cohesion.

In the course of his argument, Martin misrepresents Halliday and Hasan's work on cohesion, as demonstrated in the following critiques:

• Misrepresenting Cohesion
• Misrepresenting The Domain Of Cohesion
• Misconstruing 'Cohesion Within The Sentence'

For a summary critique of Martin's three arguments, see Why The Argument For A 'Discourse' Semantic Stratum Is Invalid.