On The Importance Of Martin's Stratification For Grammatical Metaphor

Bateman (1998: 24): 

Two essential differences between these approaches [cognitive linguistics and mainstream syntax] and that pursued by Martin are, however, the following. First, for Martin both the strata involved contribute ‘meaning’—the lexicogrammar is not a passive, automatic reflex of semantics but itself also contributes meaning as was maintained in the original Firthian tradition out of which systemic-functional linguistics has grown. This is of particular importance when we come to consider the role and function of ‘grammatical metaphor’: i.e., what happens when the semantic and grammatical options taken up are not congruent. For Halliday (and thus Martin) a significant part of the power of language comes from the ability to cross-code grammar and semantics: grammar does not slavishly follow semantics, once a sufficient degree of language use sophistication has been achieved by a language user, the natural meanings of grammar can be used to construct extended semantic configurations: the best discussed example of this being, of course, nominalisation. Here a semantic event is turned into a ‘thing’ that can be modified, counted, compared, tracked across discourse, etc. Adoption of an ‘incongruent’ realisation for a semantic configuration thus necessarily adds further meanings to that configuration, since the incongruent realisation itself has (discourse) semantic consequences. This follows straightforwardly from a basic premise of the approach: i.e., that grammar and semantics stand in a natural relationship; the patterns of grammar are recapitulations of the patterns of semantics (and vice versa).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Unknown to Bateman, Martin's notion that 'all strata make meaning' confuses stratification (all strata) with semogenesis (make meaning); see, for example, Confusing Semogenesis And Stratification or Misconstruing Stratification.  This is one of the contributing factors to Martin locating (varieties of) language, register and genre, in context.  Moreover, lexicogrammar is neither 'active' nor 'passive' with regard to semantics; the two strata are two perspectives on the same phenomenon, linguistic content, at different levels of symbolic abstraction.  That is why the relation between them is one of intensive symbolic identity (realisation).

[2] To be clear, Martin's discourse semantics undermines the notion of grammatical metaphor by not providing congruent realisations of its systems by which metaphorical realisations can be recognised as incongruent.  Moreover Martin creates mismatches between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar — e.g. conjunctive relations — even in the absence of metaphor.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor does not involve using the grammar to construct 'extended semantic configurations'.  On the contrary, in ideational metaphor, for example, an 'extended semantic configuration' such a sequence is realised more compactly as a clause instead of a clause complex.

[4] To be clear, Martin does not understand grammatical metaphor (evidence here) and his meagre discussion of it is largely confined to nominalisation.

[5] This misunderstands grammatical metaphor.  The reason grammatical metaphor 'adds further meanings' is that it is the junction or fusion of the meanings of both the congruent and incongruent realisations; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 243-4, 272, 278, 283, 287).  Any discourse semantic "consequences" are a separate matter.

[6] To be clear, this is Halliday, not Martin.

[7] To be clear, in SFL theory, the patterns of grammar and semantics are patterns of instantiation during logogenesis, and the relation between them is realisation, not "recapitulation" (restatement, reiteration, repetition etc.). Here Bateman echoes Martin's confusion between instantiation (patterns) and syntagmatic relations (structural or cohesive).  See, for example, Confusing Instantiation With The Syntagmatic Axis.