On Martin's Argument For "Stratifying Identification With Respect To Nominal Group Structure"

Bateman (1998: 11): 

These phenomena generally revolve again around cases of noncongruent relationships between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar. This was one of the general motivations for stratifying lexicogrammar and discourse semantics given in Chapter 1. ‘Noncongruent’ realisations involve Halliday’s notion of grammatical metaphor, whereby the lexicogrammar ‘repackages’ the information it expresses in diverse ways, as “variation in the expression of a given meaning’’ (IFG: p342). Applying this to IDENTIFICATION meanings, then, Martin claims [p129] that while all participants (semantic) are realised through nominal groups, it is not the case that all nominal groups realise participants.

Blogger Comments:

Here Bateman is reporting on Martin's theoretical justifications for stratifying his discourse semantic system of the textual metafunction, IDENTIFICATION, "with respect to nominal group structure".  Here are some of the thoughts that didn't occur to Bateman:

1. In order to demonstrate that the system of IDENTIFICATION is located on a higher stratum than the system of reference, Martin is looking at what he claims to be noncongruent (metaphorical) relations between units: between the proposed unstructured unit of IDENTIFICATION, the participant — the entry condition of IDENTIFICATION system Martin (1992: 129) — and the syntagmatic structure of a unit of form on the grammatical rank scale, the nominal group; and this despite the fact that the system of reference is not realised by any structure, let alone that of the nominal group.
2. Although purporting to be providing examples of incongruent (metaphorical) realisations of participants, Martin instead provides examples of mismatches between participants and nominal groups, which, if true, would be categorical, not metaphorical.
3. In purporting to provide examples of incongruent relations between participants and nominal groups, Martin, if correct, would be providing examples of ideational metaphor.  That is, Martin is purporting to use ideational metaphor to justify a stratal relation between systems of the textual metafunction (Martin glosses IDENTIFICATION as 'reference as semantic choice').  As previously explained, Martin's notion of 'participant' results from confusing the referent ('the participant tracked') with the system of referral.

On Martin's Identification Networks

Bateman (1998: 10-1):

Up until this point, it is not immediately obvious perhaps that the networks he presents are in fact discourse semantic and not grammatical: they certainly look rather similar to grammar systems for the nominal group that have been presented elsewhere. The example realisations given are also often single lexicalisations of structural elements of the nominal group, which reinforces the appearance of a grammatical statement rather than a discourse semantic one.  But Martin takes up this question explicitly and considers in closer detail a number of phenomena that favour the stratification that he claims holds between the discourse semantic networks and the networks of the nominal group within the lexicogrammar proper.

Blogger Comments:

[1] On the one hand, Martin's identification networks (Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9) bear no resemblance to nominal group systems, as a comparison with the following network (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 366) demonstrates:

On the other hand, nominal group systems are irrelevant to the semantics of grammatical reference since reference is not a system of the nominal group.  As previously explained, Martin's focus on the nominal group derives, in part, from his confusion of the interpersonal deixis of the nominal group with the cohesive system of textual reference and, in part, from his confusion of ideational denotation with textual reference.

[2] To be clear, Martin's argument is concerned with "stratifying" IDENTIFICATION 'with respect to nominal group structure'.  That is, Martin "stratifies" a discourse semantic system with respect to a grammatical structure, instead of a grammatical system, where the grammatical structure does not realise the semantic counterpart of grammatical reference.

For the arguments on which these criticisms are made, see the detailed examination of Martin's chapter on IDENTIFICATION here.

On The Goal And Focus Of Martin's Chapter On Identification

Bateman (1998: 10):

In contrast to his starting point with grammatical systems in Chapter 2, here he begins with text: and, in particular, a brief text written by a 7 year old illustrating various discourse semantic deficiencies (with respect to the adult language) in the construction and selection of its nominal groups — most particularly, problems in signalling recoverability. It is clear that the child has grasped the options that the grammatical system makes available and so the problems strongly suggest that the remaining difficulties are of a semantic nature. The precise details of the semantic discourse options motivating the textually appropriate selection of primarily nominal group grammatical options is then the goal of the chapter. “The focus will be on how English is structured to refer to participants, not simply on how it is used to do so.’’ [p95]

Blogger Comments:

[1] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that the child's 'problems in signalling recoverability' are not problems of reference in the child's text, but problems in Martin's analysis of the reference in the child's text.  See Misunderstanding The Use Of Reference In A Child's Text.

[2] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that, because grammatical reference is not a system of the nominal group, its semantic counterpart, IDENTIFICATION, is not realised by features of nominal group systems.  Moreover, Martin's IDENTIFICATION system takes 'participant' as it entry condition, but its features do not elaborate the participant (cf. clause systems), but instead elaborate potential relations between participants.

[3] Some of the thoughts that didn't occur to Bateman here are that:

• grammatical reference is not a structural system;
• participants are not the only potential referents;
• participants are clause rank experiential functions;
• Martin's "structures" are not structures of units, but relations between units;
• Martin's 'referring to participants' is ideational denotation, not textual reference.

On Martin's 'Identification'

Bateman (1998: 10):

Chapter 3 on IDENTIFICATION [pp93–157] considers the role of nominal groups in the construction of text; it is well known that nominal groups do more than just pick out entities in the ‘world’, the many possibilities for forming nominal groups involve a range of ‘text-building’ devices, most of which have been described grammatically in Halliday and Hasan (1976). Martin turns here to their semantic description, emphasising the perspective of reference as a semantic choice of the speaker.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's focus on nominal groups in his chapter on 'reference as semantic choice' arises from several serious misunderstandings of the SFL model of textual reference.

Most broadly, Martin confuses Halliday & Hasan's textual reference with Frege's reference (bedeutung), which is concerned with reference to meanings held to be transcendent of language.  On the one hand, this is ideational denotation, not textual reference, which is why an experiential category, participant — realised by a nominal group — is the unit and entry condition to the textual system of IDENTIFICATION.  On the other hand, Frege's reference is inconsistent with SFL theory, since the latter holds that all meaning is confined to semiotic systems (immanent).

Related to this, Martin confuses identifiability — 'the textual status at issue in the system of reference' (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 623) — with identification, in the ideational sense, which is why the chapter is concerned participant identification and the tracking of participants (realised by nominal groups).

Related to this, Martin mistakes the non-structural (cohesive) system of reference to be a system that is realised in the nominal group structure.  He does this by confusing textual reference with a genuine system of the nominal group, interpersonal deixis.  To be clear, reference items appear in two grammatical domains, nominal group and adverbial group, but their reference function is not an element of group structure.

[2] Here Bateman uncritically follows Martin.  To be clear, in SFL theory, nominal groups do not "pick out" entities in the 'world', since this the transcendent view of meaning exemplified by Frege's reference (bedeutung).

[3] Here Bateman follows Martin in confusing the structurally realised systems of the nominal group with the non-structural (cohesive) systems whose grammatical domains include the nominal group.

[4] This is true.  Martin's work derives from Halliday & Hasan (1976), but misunderstands it, relocates it to his stratum of discourse semantics (misunderstood as a 'module'), and rebrands the relocated misunderstandings as his system of IDENTIFICATION.

On Martin's Understanding Of Stratification

Bateman (1998: 9-10):

Thus, for example, whereas some accounts of interaction previously have needed to go inside the structure of individual discourse moves, … the discourse semantics of English Text can instead leave much of the work here to grammar and retain simpler congruent move realisations as an independent clause or incongruent move realisations as sequences of sentences related conjunctively. … 

As Martin writes:

“The general point here is that if the grammar, or phonology for that matter ..., does the work, so be it. The model developed here does not dualise meaning and form so does not have to re-state the contributions made by phonology and lexicogrammar to text structure at the level of semantics. Equally important, ... is the fact that negotiation provides just one of four perspectives on text structure...’’ [p56] ... “[T]he modular approach to discourse means that no one component is responsible for accounting comprehensively for textual relations.’’[p268]

Blogger Comments:

[1] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin's model is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the architecture of SFL theory, in as much as he misunderstands both strata and metafunctions as interacting modules, instead of levels of symbolic abstraction and organising principles, respectively.

[2] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin does not understand that strata represent different levels of symbolic abstraction.  Because of this, discourse semantics cannot "leave much of the work to grammar".  Instead, the grammar realises semantics, and if the theorising is to be consistent, the semantics that the grammar realises needs to be identified. 

[3] The thoughts that didn't occur to Bateman here are that Martin confuses 'marked' with 'incongruent' and proposes incongruent grammatical realisations that are not metaphorical.

[4] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin mistakes all strata — even phonology — as levels of meaning; hence the claim that his model "does not dualise meaning and form".  Martin's error derives from mistaking semogenesis — his "all strata make meaning" — for stratification, where meaning, wording and sounding constitute different levels of symbolic abstraction.  See also:

• Confusing Semogenesis With Stratification
• Confusing Semogenesis With Levels Of Symbolic Abstraction
• Confusing Semogenesis With Stratification

On Martin's Modularity

Bateman (1998: 9):

This leads to an important strand in the discussion that also runs through many of the later chapters: the concept of modularity. English Text distributes its linguistic work across lexicogrammar and the four components of discourse semantics. What some approaches would therefore have tried to include in their exchange structure analysis, Martin separates out, allowing other components to contribute. This simplifies the overall account in a number of ways, and also opens up the significant topic of interaction between modules.

Blogger Comments:

The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that the architecture of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory is not modular, but dimensional; see also here.  Halliday & Webster (2009: 231):

In SFL language is described, or “modelled”, in terms of several dimensions, or parameters, which taken together define the “architecture” of language. These are 

(i) the hierarchy of strata (context, semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology, phonetics; related by realisation); 

(ii) the hierarchy of rank (e.g. clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme; related by composition); 

(iii) the cline of instantiation (system to instance);  

(iv) the cline of delicacy (least delicate to most delicate, or grossest to finest);  

(v) the opposition of axis (paradigmatic and syntagmatic);  

(vi) the organisation by metafunction (ideational (experiential, logical), interpersonal, textual).

Misunderstanding the architecture of the theory in this way creates serious theoretical inconsistencies in Martin's model, as will be demonstrated on this blog in the critiques of Bateman's review of Martin's Chapter 6, and has already been demonstrated here.

On Martin's 'Incongruence'

Bateman (1998: 9):

Martin also suggests problems with Ventola’s definition of move complexes as being realised as paratactic clause complexes and instead relies on a stratal mismatch (incongruency) to allow a discourse move that can be realised congruently by a single full clause, but incongruently as a sequence of clauses or even sentences related conjunctively (cf. Chapter 4).

Blogger Comments:

There are two thoughts that did not occur to Bateman here, both of theoretical importance:

1. Martin (pp58-9) confuses congruence with unmarkedness, as explained at Confusing Unmarkedness And Congruence.
2. In proposing such incongruent relations between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar, Martin is unwittingly proposing that such realisations are metaphorical — a claim that he does not make (and could not be maintained in a manner consistent with theory).

On Martin's System Of Negotiation

Bateman (1998: 8):

Martin adopts a number of different starting points for his discussions, providing good insights into different ways of approaching discourse semantics. His starting point for Chapter 2 [pp31-92] on NEGOTIATION is the grammatical systems of MOOD: i.e., that part of clause grammar that describes basic interactional functions such as assertion, question, imperative, tags, finite vs. nonfinite, dependent vs. independent, and polarity (cf. IFG: Chapter 4; Matthiessen, 1995: Chapter 5, pp391-433). The system network for NEGOTIATION that Martin derives must provide motivations for selections from the MOOD system as are appropriate for particular dialogue moves. The basic framework set up is one that describes the semantic unit ‘text’ as an exchange of meanings. Such exchanges are organised into configurations of discourse moves; the particular configurations of moves that are found establish a notion of exchange structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents Martin's theoretical inconsistencies as a virtue.  The different starting point for the system of NEGOTIATION reflects its different source (interpersonal semantics) from the other discourse semantic systems (textual lexicogrammar).

[2] Trivially, this confuses the grammatical system of MOOD with the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[3] To be clear, "the system network for NEGOTIATION that Martin derives" is not displayed as an integrated network, but instead consists of:

• Figure 2.10 (p49): Ventola's (1987) extension of Berry (1981);
• Figure 2.11 (p49): Martin's augmentation of it with a less delicate system; and
• Figure 2.23 (p81): Martin's addition a more delicate system (parallel with Ventola's) which only applies to classroom registers.

[4] This misunderstands the relation between strata.  Semantic systems don't "motivate" grammatical selections; (selections in) semantic systems are realised by (selections in) grammatical systems, and the relation between the selections may be congruent or incongruent (metaphorical), and vary in terms of probability according to register.

[5] This is misleading on two counts.  On the one hand, it misrepresents the relation between the systems of NEGOTIATION and MOOD.  Martin's model (p50) distinguishes two ranks, exchange and move.  NEGOTIATION is the system of exchange rank, and it is not realised by any grammatical system.  Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION is the system of move rank, and it is realised by the the grammatical system of MOOD.

On the other hand, since the relation between SPEECH FUNCTION selections and MOOD selections was theorised by Halliday, long before Martin, it falsely attributes Halliday's ideas to Martin.  Moreover, Martin (1992: 36) misunderstands the realisation relation between SPEECH FUNCTION and MOOD, as demonstrated here.

[6] This confuses Halliday's highest semantic unit, text, with Martin's highest discourse semantic unit, exchange.

On Martin's 'Synoptic Vs Dynamic' Distinction

Bateman (1998: 8):

There is also an important difference with respect to the status of text as ‘product’ or as ‘process’. Of the regions discussed only NEGOTIATION has a significantly developed ‘static’ component — hence the multivariate structure adopted for exchanges. The remainder are more dynamic and concerned with the unfolding of texts, giving a very different flavour to the discourse structures used. The dynamic aspect is also taken up at some length in the discussion of genre [pp550–557]. Reconciliation of these differing perspectives and structures remains an exciting area for future work, just as it does for lexicogrammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Bateman's wording conceals Martin's confusion of the realisation of system as (synoptic) structure with the (dynamic) instantiation of the system in logogenesis.  See for example:

• Confusing Realisation And Instantiantion
• Misconstruing Realisation And Instantiation

[2] This is misleading.  The difference lies in the different intellectual sources of Martin's theorising.  The system of NEGOTIATION is taken from the previous work of colleagues on (structural) interpersonal semantics, whereas the systems of IDENTIFICATION, CONJUNCTION and IDEATION are taken from the previous work of colleagues on (non-structural) textual lexicogrammar.

[3] This is misleading.  The discussion of 'dynamic perspectives' on genre is very brief (three paragraphs), and does little more than refer to Ventola's flowchart of a service encounter (Figure 7.22, pp554-5).

On The Type Of Structure And Direction Of Dependency For Discourse Systems

Bateman (1998: 8):

Table 5.21 [p332] also sets out for each type of semantic structure the direction of dependencies typically found among its covariately related units. We can therefore see that each region, and hence each chapter, discusses its own particular ‘discourse structural’ configurations and the system network of alternatives that gives rise to those configurations.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  Table 5.21 provides very little differentiation of "discourse structures":

Table 5.21. Type of structure and direction of dependency for discourse systems

	STRUCTURE	DIRECTION OF DEPENDENCY
NEGOTIATION	multivariate & covariate	prospective & retrospective
IDENTIFICATION	covariate	retrospective (occasionally cataphoric)
CONJUNCTION	covariate	retrospective (occasionally cataphoric)
IDEATION	covariate	prospective & retrospective

[2] This is misleading.  Martin's system networks provide no realisation rules that specify structural realisations.

Favourably Misrepresenting Martin's Discourse Structures

Bateman (1998: 7-8):

These diverse discourse structures are developed in detail and with copious examples in their own particular chapters, but a number of useful overview tables are also given towards the end of Chapter 5. For example, the semantic units participating in discourse structures are summarised in Table 5.18 [p325] thus:

Table 5.18. Discourse semantics: units proposed in English Text
interpersonal	textual	ideational: logical	experiential
exchange
move		message
	participant		message part

As within the grammar, different labellings are proposed within each metafunction. That is: the region of NEGOTIATION, which is concerned with the interpersonal construction of text as an unfolding ‘exchange’, links together discourse ‘moves’; the region of CONJUNCTION, which is concerned with how meanings are combined together to form larger ‘logically’ related meanings, links ‘messages’; the region of IDENTIFICATION, concerned with establishing reference to discourse entities, links ‘participants’; and the region of IDEATION, concerned with ‘the company that words keep’, links ‘message parts’.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The term 'diverse' here is misleading.  Martin (1992: 331) describes all his structures as covariate, with the addition of multivariate structure in the case of his interpersonal meaning; see previous post.  Importantly, 'covariate' (Lemke 1985) is not a type of structure, as later acknowledged by Lemke (1988: 159) himself.

[2] The notion of 'units participating in discourse structures' conceals an inconsistency in Martin's structure types, deriving from his confusing structured units with units in a relation.  To be clear, Martin's interpersonal units are structured units, like the clause in the grammar, whereas the units of Martin's other metafunctions are units in relations to other units, like Halliday's cohesive relations that Martin has misunderstood, rebranded and relocated, stratally and metafunctionally, from lexicogrammar to discourse semantics.

[3] This echoes Martin's confusing of the realisation relation between system (negotiation) and structure (exchange), on the one hand, with the instantiation of potential in logogenesis (unfolding of text), on the other.  See, for example, Confusing Realisation And Instantiantion.

[4] The use of 'links' here continues the concealment of the inconsistencies in Martin's notion of structure, as identified above in [2].  The relation between 'exchange' and 'move' is one of constituency: an exchange consists of moves.  The notion of NEGOTIATION "linking" moves falsely construes interpersonal structure as consistent with

• CONJUNCTION "linking" messages, 
• IDENTIFICATION "linking" messages, and
• IDEATION "linking" message parts.

The notion of 'links' is consistent with the notion of 'cohesive ties': the non-structural relations in the systems of cohesion that Martin has rebranded, relocated and misunderstood as discourse semantic structural relations.

On Martin's Four Discourse Semantic Systems

Bateman (1998: 6-7):

The four regions of discourse semantics addressed in depth are NEGOTIATION, IDENTIFICATION, CONJUNCTION and IDEATION. NEGOTIATION concerns those resources of discourse semantics that are responsible for the construction of dialogue and interaction. IDENTIFICATION captures the semantic resources for referring to and tracking discourse participants. CONJUNCTION develops the ‘logic’ of English text in terms of those resources by which semantic messages are combined into larger complex messages, and through which messages are related to previously expressed messages as a text or dialogue unfolds. And IDEATION attempts to motivate those systematic selections from groups of ‘related’ lexical items that bring about a text’s ‘lexical’ cohesion. Each of these therefore illustrates a distinct general kind of meaning carried in discourse and can be broadly allocated to a particular metafunction: NEGOTIATION is broadly interpersonal, IDENTIFICATION textual, CONJUNCTION logical, and IDEATION experiential. Consequently, as with grammar, it appears the case that diverse kinds of discourse structure may be usefully posited for each area.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in theoretical terms, these four are proposed systems of a proposed discourse semantic stratum.

[2] To be clear, this is the apt subtitle of the chapter on CONJUNCTION. For some of the violations of logic in this chapter, see the 103 critiques here.  Martin abandons the most general categories of expansion — elaboration, extension and enhancement — and because Martin's CONJUNCTION is a largely a rebranding, relocating and misunderstanding of Halliday's system of grammatical cohesion, it doesn't include the other major logico-semantic system, projection, at all. This undermines any systematic account of grammatical metaphor, even if it redefined less precisely as 'interstratal tension'.

[3] The use of 'broadly' here is an unjustified hedge.  Metafunctions are distinct perspectives on meaning, and Martin specifically assigns each of his systems to each of the metafunctions.

[4] The proposed unit of Martin's textual system of IDENTIFICATION is the experiential category 'participant'.  Martin's system is a rebranding, relocating and misunderstanding of Halliday's grammatical system of cohesive reference, as demonstrated here.

[5] Martin's logical system of CONJUNCTION is a confusion of the structural relations between clauses in complexes (logical metafunction) and non-structural cohesive conjunctive relations (textual metafuction).

[6] Martin's experiential system of IDEATION is a confusion of lexical cohesion (textual metafunction), and misunderstandings of 'lexis as most delicate grammar', inter alia, as demonstrated here.

[7] This is misleading.  As Martin (1992: 331) points out after describing all four of his discourse semantic systems:

All the discourse structures introduced to this point have been covariate ones, with the exception of the multivariate interpretation of the exchange introduced in Chapter 2. But even there the multivariate approach presented only a partial picture; covariate tracking and challenging structures had to be developed to fill out the picture. Lexical relations are also covariate structures — message parts depend semantically on each other, and depending message parts are themselves depended on.

That is, for the most part, the "diverse kinds of discourse structure…posited for each area" is the one kind, covariate — which was later repudiated as a structure type by its originator, Lemke, several years before Martin's publication, as previously shown.  For a critique of the above extract, see here.

On Discourse Semantic System And Structure

Bateman (1998: 6-7):

With the basic premise and components in place, Chapter 1 thus sets the scene for an exciting investigation that the rest of the book can only begin. The second part of the book addresses particular areas of the discourse semantics in detail. For each area of discourse semantics addressed, Martin sets out both discourse semantic system networks, generally motivating these with examples, and discourse semantic structures.

Blogger Comment:

This is very misleading. Martin provides no realisation statements in his discourse semantic system networks that specify his discourse semantic "structures". Attempts to do so would have exposed the confusions in the model.

On Covariate "Structures"

Bateman (1998: 6):

The principal kinds of structure so far investigated for grammar are multivariate constituency structures and univariate dependency structures. … Martin then establishes that there are relationships between elements at a discourse level which do not fit these categories developed for grammar. There appear to be at least two kinds of additional relationship, both heralded by the notion of cohesive ties: phoric relationships, where one element is ‘presumed’ by another, and expectant relationships, where two (or more) items are ‘mutually expectant’. The former is illustrated in reference chains such as a robot—the android—it—it—...; the latter in lexical strings such as manoeuvring— crossing—separated—tacking—veered—...[p364]. Both kinds are termed covariate (cf. Lemke, 1985), which distinguishes them as a group from the previously considered grammatical structural relationships. Most of the kinds of discourse structure discussed later in the book draw on covariate structures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  Of the multivariate structures, only those of the experiential metafunction are said to be based on constituency.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451, 85):

… the relationships among the elements in a multivariate structure can be characterised as segmental from an experiential point of view but as prosodic from an interpersonal point of view and as culminative from a textual one.

[2] This is very misleading. Martin does not establish this, he merely asserts it — without defining what he means by structure. More importantly, the reason why these 'relationships between elements' do not fit the structure types developed for the grammar is that they are not structures. Martin relocates the non-structural resources of the textual metafunction, cohesion, from the grammatical stratum to the semantic stratum, rebrands them, and distributes them across the metafunctions. This results in theoretical inconsistencies in terms of structure, stratification and metafunction; see Inconsistencies In The Notion Of 'Discourse Semantic Structure'.

[3] This theoretical use of 'expectancy' can be found in Barthes (1966/1977: 101-4), but Martin uses it in his model of discourse semantics without acknowledging the source.  At the symposium to honour the late Ruqaiya Hasan, Martin falsely accused Hasan of not acknowledging Mitchell as one of her sources (evidence here).

[4] Here Bateman uncritically accepts Martin's misinterpretation of cohesive reference, which confuses the referents with the resource for referring.  This confusion leads to problems in distinguishing reference chains (Halliday & Hasan's grammatical reference) from lexical strings (Halliday & Hasan's lexical cohesion).  See "One Apparently Unresolved Problem With Hasan's Technique" and The Problem Of Overlapping Lexical Strings And Reference Chains.

[5] Lemke (1988: 159) reinterprets his 'covariate structure' as a structuring principle, rather than a kind of structure:

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

Martin includes Lemke (1988) in his list of references (1992: 603).

Confusing Axial Realisation With Instantiation And Logogenesis

Bateman (1998: 5-6):

Showing how this works in detail is then the task taken up in the second part of the book, where, for several distinct regions of discourse semantics, Martin attempts to provide both paradigmatic and syntagmatic semantic descriptions and to show how these relate, i.e., how the semantic potential captured by the paradigmatic options described is actualised in unfolding discourse structures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  In SFL theory, the relation between the paradigmatic axis (system) and the syntagmatic axis (structure) is realisation.  Martin provides no realisation statements in his discourse semantic systems that specify how options are realised structurally.

[2] In SFL theory, the relation between 'potential' and 'actualised' is one of instantiation.  In using these terms to describe the realisation relation between system and structure, Bateman is uncritically repeating the error in Martin (1992: 4), as critiqued here.

[3] This repeats Martin's confusion of logogenesis — the unfolding of the text at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation — with syntagmatic structure.  This further compounds the error of mistaking axial realisation for instantiation.  See also John Bateman Misunderstanding Realisation And Instantiation.