On Martin's Understanding Of Stratification

Bateman (1998: 9-10):

Thus, for example, whereas some accounts of interaction previously have needed to go inside the structure of individual discourse moves, … the discourse semantics of English Text can instead leave much of the work here to grammar and retain simpler congruent move realisations as an independent clause or incongruent move realisations as sequences of sentences related conjunctively. … 

As Martin writes:

“The general point here is that if the grammar, or phonology for that matter ..., does the work, so be it. The model developed here does not dualise meaning and form so does not have to re-state the contributions made by phonology and lexicogrammar to text structure at the level of semantics. Equally important, ... is the fact that negotiation provides just one of four perspectives on text structure...’’ [p56] ... “[T]he modular approach to discourse means that no one component is responsible for accounting comprehensively for textual relations.’’[p268]

Blogger Comments:

[1] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin's model is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the architecture of SFL theory, in as much as he misunderstands both strata and metafunctions as interacting modules, instead of levels of symbolic abstraction and organising principles, respectively.

[2] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin does not understand that strata represent different levels of symbolic abstraction.  Because of this, discourse semantics cannot "leave much of the work to grammar".  Instead, the grammar realises semantics, and if the theorising is to be consistent, the semantics that the grammar realises needs to be identified. 

[3] The thoughts that didn't occur to Bateman here are that Martin confuses 'marked' with 'incongruent' and proposes incongruent grammatical realisations that are not metaphorical.

[4] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin mistakes all strata — even phonology — as levels of meaning; hence the claim that his model "does not dualise meaning and form".  Martin's error derives from mistaking semogenesis — his "all strata make meaning" — for stratification, where meaning, wording and sounding constitute different levels of symbolic abstraction.  See also:

• Confusing Semogenesis With Stratification
• Confusing Semogenesis With Levels Of Symbolic Abstraction
• Confusing Semogenesis With Stratification

On Martin's Modularity

Bateman (1998: 9):

This leads to an important strand in the discussion that also runs through many of the later chapters: the concept of modularity. English Text distributes its linguistic work across lexicogrammar and the four components of discourse semantics. What some approaches would therefore have tried to include in their exchange structure analysis, Martin separates out, allowing other components to contribute. This simplifies the overall account in a number of ways, and also opens up the significant topic of interaction between modules.

Blogger Comments:

The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that the architecture of Systemic Functional Linguistic theory is not modular, but dimensional; see also here.  Halliday & Webster (2009: 231):

In SFL language is described, or “modelled”, in terms of several dimensions, or parameters, which taken together define the “architecture” of language. These are 

(i) the hierarchy of strata (context, semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology, phonetics; related by realisation); 

(ii) the hierarchy of rank (e.g. clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme; related by composition); 

(iii) the cline of instantiation (system to instance);  

(iv) the cline of delicacy (least delicate to most delicate, or grossest to finest);  

(v) the opposition of axis (paradigmatic and syntagmatic);  

(vi) the organisation by metafunction (ideational (experiential, logical), interpersonal, textual).

Misunderstanding the architecture of the theory in this way creates serious theoretical inconsistencies in Martin's model, as will be demonstrated on this blog in the critiques of Bateman's review of Martin's Chapter 6, and has already been demonstrated here.

On Martin's 'Incongruence'

Bateman (1998: 9):

Martin also suggests problems with Ventola’s definition of move complexes as being realised as paratactic clause complexes and instead relies on a stratal mismatch (incongruency) to allow a discourse move that can be realised congruently by a single full clause, but incongruently as a sequence of clauses or even sentences related conjunctively (cf. Chapter 4).

Blogger Comments:

There are two thoughts that did not occur to Bateman here, both of theoretical importance:

1. Martin (pp58-9) confuses congruence with unmarkedness, as explained at Confusing Unmarkedness And Congruence.
2. In proposing such incongruent relations between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar, Martin is unwittingly proposing that such realisations are metaphorical — a claim that he does not make (and could not be maintained in a manner consistent with theory).

On Martin's System Of Negotiation

Bateman (1998: 8):

Martin adopts a number of different starting points for his discussions, providing good insights into different ways of approaching discourse semantics. His starting point for Chapter 2 [pp31-92] on NEGOTIATION is the grammatical systems of MOOD: i.e., that part of clause grammar that describes basic interactional functions such as assertion, question, imperative, tags, finite vs. nonfinite, dependent vs. independent, and polarity (cf. IFG: Chapter 4; Matthiessen, 1995: Chapter 5, pp391-433). The system network for NEGOTIATION that Martin derives must provide motivations for selections from the MOOD system as are appropriate for particular dialogue moves. The basic framework set up is one that describes the semantic unit ‘text’ as an exchange of meanings. Such exchanges are organised into configurations of discourse moves; the particular configurations of moves that are found establish a notion of exchange structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents Martin's theoretical inconsistencies as a virtue.  The different starting point for the system of NEGOTIATION reflects its different source (interpersonal semantics) from the other discourse semantic systems (textual lexicogrammar).

[2] Trivially, this confuses the grammatical system of MOOD with the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[3] To be clear, "the system network for NEGOTIATION that Martin derives" is not displayed as an integrated network, but instead consists of:

• Figure 2.10 (p49): Ventola's (1987) extension of Berry (1981);
• Figure 2.11 (p49): Martin's augmentation of it with a less delicate system; and
• Figure 2.23 (p81): Martin's addition a more delicate system (parallel with Ventola's) which only applies to classroom registers.

[4] This misunderstands the relation between strata.  Semantic systems don't "motivate" grammatical selections; (selections in) semantic systems are realised by (selections in) grammatical systems, and the relation between the selections may be congruent or incongruent (metaphorical), and vary in terms of probability according to register.

[5] This is misleading on two counts.  On the one hand, it misrepresents the relation between the systems of NEGOTIATION and MOOD.  Martin's model (p50) distinguishes two ranks, exchange and move.  NEGOTIATION is the system of exchange rank, and it is not realised by any grammatical system.  Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION is the system of move rank, and it is realised by the the grammatical system of MOOD.

On the other hand, since the relation between SPEECH FUNCTION selections and MOOD selections was theorised by Halliday, long before Martin, it falsely attributes Halliday's ideas to Martin.  Moreover, Martin (1992: 36) misunderstands the realisation relation between SPEECH FUNCTION and MOOD, as demonstrated here.

[6] This confuses Halliday's highest semantic unit, text, with Martin's highest discourse semantic unit, exchange.

On Martin's 'Synoptic Vs Dynamic' Distinction

Bateman (1998: 8):

There is also an important difference with respect to the status of text as ‘product’ or as ‘process’. Of the regions discussed only NEGOTIATION has a significantly developed ‘static’ component — hence the multivariate structure adopted for exchanges. The remainder are more dynamic and concerned with the unfolding of texts, giving a very different flavour to the discourse structures used. The dynamic aspect is also taken up at some length in the discussion of genre [pp550–557]. Reconciliation of these differing perspectives and structures remains an exciting area for future work, just as it does for lexicogrammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Bateman's wording conceals Martin's confusion of the realisation of system as (synoptic) structure with the (dynamic) instantiation of the system in logogenesis.  See for example:

• Confusing Realisation And Instantiantion
• Misconstruing Realisation And Instantiation

[2] This is misleading.  The difference lies in the different intellectual sources of Martin's theorising.  The system of NEGOTIATION is taken from the previous work of colleagues on (structural) interpersonal semantics, whereas the systems of IDENTIFICATION, CONJUNCTION and IDEATION are taken from the previous work of colleagues on (non-structural) textual lexicogrammar.

[3] This is misleading.  The discussion of 'dynamic perspectives' on genre is very brief (three paragraphs), and does little more than refer to Ventola's flowchart of a service encounter (Figure 7.22, pp554-5).