On Martin's Mistaking Different Manifestations Of Expansion For Different Realisations Of Conjunction

Bateman (1998: 13-4):

CONJUNCTION is then perhaps quite appropriately the discourse semantic region for which Martin discusses the most varied selection of possible lexicogrammatical realisations. Not only does he make sure to preserve the required continuity between congruent grammatical realisation in terms of clause complexes and cohesive realisations of conjunctive relations (as illustrated in examples (c-f) above), he also makes considerable use of the diverse grammatical metaphors available below the clause. Thus, the following variants can all be seen as alternative realisations of a single discourse semantic temporal relation between two semantic messages [pp168–169]:

We walk the ring with our dogs and then we just wait.
After we walk the ring with our dogs, we just wait.
Subsequent to walking the ring with our dogs, we just wait.
After our tour of the ring, we just wait.
Our tour of the ring is prior to our wait.
Our tour of the ring is before we wait.
Our tour of the ring is the antecedent of our wait.
Our tour of the ring precedes our wait.
The first thing we do is tour the ring with our dogs; the second thing we do is we wait. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's conjunction is Halliday & Hasan's (1976) conjunction, relocated from lexicogrammar to discourse semantics, and misunderstood as a structural logical system instead of a non-structural (cohesive) textual system.  The theoretical inconsistencies are both stratal and metafunctional.  To add to the confusion, Martin also relocates expansion relations between clauses from lexicogrammar to discourse semantics, while ignoring projection relations; that is, the logico-semantic relation of projection is entirely absent from Martin's logical discourse semantics, with the consequence that projection systems in the lexicogrammar have no discourse semantic systems to realise.

To add further to the confusion, because Martin uses Halliday & Hasan (1976) as the source of his ideas, instead of Halliday (1985), his conjunction systems do not present elaboration, extension and enhancement as the most general types of relations, with the consequence that the stratal relation between discourse semantic and grammatical features are incongruent, even in the absence of grammatical metaphor.

To add further still to the confusion, Martin misunderstands and misapplies the types of expansion, including the distinction between internal and external relations, which he claims (wrongly) to be the 'main factor distinguishing Halliday's (1985) classification from that being developed here (1992: 182).

For the evidence on which all the above assessments are based, and much more, see the extensive clarifications and critiques here.

[2] To be clear, in "preserving the required continuity between congruent grammatical realisation in terms of clause complexes and cohesive realisations of conjunctive relations", Martin confuses expansion in the service of the logical metafunction (clause complexes) with expansion in the service of the textual metafunction (cohesive conjunction) and relocates the confusion from lexicogrammar to discourse semantics.

[3] To be clear, this "considerable use" amounts to displaying a few example sentences on a single page (p169).

[4] To be clear, Martin confuses conjunction with the more general resource of expansion, of which conjunction is but one manifestation.  What these instances have in common is not conjunction, but the expansion category temporal enhancement.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 669) 'present a systematic and comprehensive summary of the different grammatical environments in which elaboration, extension and enhancement are manifested':

the environments of manifestation can be differentiated in terms of (i) metafunction – textual (CONJUNCTION), logical (INTERDEPENDENCY; MODIFICATION) and experiential (CIRCUMSTANTIATION; PROCESS TYPE: relational), and (ii) rank – clause and group/phrase. …

From a grammatical point of view, the environments … are, of course, all different. But seen from above, from the vantage point of semantics, they are all agnate ways of construing expansion. Collectively they thus construe expansion as a semantic system. This means that for any given type of expansion we want to express, we have at our disposal a range of resources.

[5] To be clear, in SFL theory, a message is a textual unit at the level of semantics (cf. 'clause as message').  This is why cohesive conjunction, a grammatical resource of the textual metafunction, is concerned with conjoining messages.  In rebranding Halliday & Hasan's (1976) textual grammar as his own logical discourse semantics, Martin also rebrands a textual unit as a logical unit.

On Martin's Misrepresentation Of Halliday & Hasan (1976)

Bateman (1998: 13):

Martin also attempts [p180] what he terms a “less materialist’’ and more semiotic interpretation of the internal/external division, drawing on the relationships between discourse semantics, register and genre that he sets out in Chapter 7; external relations then relate to ‘field’, the “institutional organisation of our culture’’, and internal relations relate to the ‘text genre’, the “organisation of text as it is formulated to construct our culture.’’ Conjunction is thus seen as the “most upward-looking’’ system in the discourse semantics and, as such, is suggested as a particularly useful place to start whenever the structure of a whole text is to be considered [p269].

Blogger Comments:

[1] Martin's misrepresentation of the source of his ideas — Halliday & Hasan's distinction between internal and external conjunctive relations — as "materialist" derives from his own misunderstanding of their distinction.  Martin (1992: 180):

Internal relations in other words structure semiosis; external ones code the structure of the world.

As Halliday & Hasan (1976: 241) point out, it is both types of cohesive conjunction that create text, not merely internal conjunctive relations.  This is hardly surprising, given the fact that conjunction is a resource of the textual metafunction, rather than of the logical metafunction, and given the fact that the textual metafunction is concerned with 'semiotic reality' — 'reality in the form of meaning' — rather than with 'natural reality' (ideational metafunction) or 'intersubjective reality' (interpersonal metafunction); see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398).

[2] To be clear, Martin's reinterpretation of Halliday's context, the culture as a semiotic system, confuses culture with varieties of language, register and genre; see the clarifications and critiques of Martin's Chapter 7 here.  In SFL theory, language lies on the expression plane of context.

Significantly, it is Martin (1992: 33, 39-40, 122) who, in earlier chapters, adopts a "materialist perspective", confusing semiotic context with material setting.

[3] To be clear, Martin's proposal is to relate one type of conjunctive relation to the lower level of his model of context, and the other type of conjunctive relation the higher level of his model of context, skipping the lower level,

• where strata are misunderstood as interacting modules (p390), rather than levels of symbolic abstraction, and
• where the strata are varieties of language misunderstood as cultural context.

Moreover, Halliday's system of conjunction, a resource of the textual metafunction, is misunderstood by Martin as a logical system, and relocated from lexicogrammar to discourse semantics.

[4] This quoted glossing of 'field' is inconsistent with both SFL theory and Martin's own use of the term. In SFL theory, 'field' refers to the ideational dimension of the culture as semiotic system, whereas 'institution' refers to a point of variation on the cline of instantiation, namely sub-potentials of the culture as semiotic system (which are realised by sub-potentials of language: registers). In Martin's usage, on the other hand, 'field' usually refers, in SFL terms, to the ideational dimension of semantics: the domain that realises a contextual field. For Martin's misunderstandings and inconsistencies with regard to field, see the clarifications and critiques here.

[5] This quoted glossing of 'genre' is inconsistent with both SFL theory and Martin's own use of the term. In SFL theory, 'genre' is Hasan's (1985/9: 64) term for text type, which is, in turn, register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. In Martin's usage, 'genre' refers to context, whereas the organisation of text is the organisation of an instance of language, not context.

One possible source of Martin's confusion could be his misunderstanding of Hasan's (1985/9: 64) model of 'Generic Structure Potential', which is concerned with the potential semantic structure of texts according to type (genre).

[6] This quote from Martin, exemplifies his misunderstanding of strata as interacting modules, instead of as levels of symbolic abstraction. The relation between strata is an intensive identifying relation, with the lower stratum as Token and the higher stratum as Value; a Token does not "look up to" a Value — a Token realises a Value at a lower level of abstraction.

[7] To be clear, the original source of Martin's model, Halliday & Hasan's (1976) cohesive conjunction, is a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction at the level of lexicogrammar. There are two significant reasons, then, from the perspective of SFL theory, why conjunction is not a model of text (semantic) structure:

• conjunction is not structural, and 
• conjunction is not semantic.

On Internal vs External Conjunctive Relations

Bateman (1998: 13):

Distinct networks are also presented for both the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ (cf. Halliday and Hasan, 1976:241) guises of the logico-semantic relationships. This latter division is one that is now well-established in work on discourse connectives, although usually referred to under different terms (e.g., quite typically, ‘semantic’ for external, and ‘pragmatic’ for internal: cf. Sanders, 1997 and the further references there). Internal relations, according to Halliday and Hasan, are when conjunctive relations are used to create text; external relations are when the relations refer to some experiential ‘reality’ external to the text. An example of the distinction is the contrast in meanings involved in (i).

(i.a) He is out of breath because he has been running.

(i.b) He has been running because he is out of breath.

In (i.a) the consequential causal relationship is one external to the text: the cause of his being out of breath is that he had been running; in (i.b), however, the causal relationship is within the text itself, a paraphrase of the sentence would be:

The reason that I believe, and am telling you, that he has been running is that he is out of breath.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin (1992: 182) emphasises the centrality of the internal vs external distinction in his rebranding of Halliday's work:

The centrality of the internal/external distinction to an adequate account of the discourse semantics of logical relations is the main factor distinguishing Halliday's (1985) classification of expansion from that being developed here.

However, as demonstrated by the 50 clarifications and critiques here, Martin misunderstands Halliday & Hasan's (1976) distinction between internal and external conjunctive relations.

[2] Here Bateman, following Martin (1992: 180), also misunderstands Halliday & Hasan's distinction.  Both external and internal conjunctive relations are used to create text.  Halliday & Hasan (1976: 241):

The distinction between external and internal conjunctive relations, in textual cohesion, is made on the basis of the metafunctional distinction between experiential and interpersonal.  Halliday & Hasan (1976: 240):

[3] The use of 'refer' here demonstrates that Bateman takes a transcendent perspective on meaning, such that the meanings of language refer to meanings outside language.  This contradicts the perspective taken by SFL theory, which assumes that meaning is immanent, within semiotic systems like language, such that experience is construed as meaning.

[4] Here Bateman, following Martin (1992: 180), misunderstands the external/internal distinction to mean external/internal to the text; see [3].  To be clear, both types of conjunctive relation are internal to the text.  For Halliday & Hasan (1976: 240), the external/internal distinction means external/internal to the communication situation:

On The Logic Of English Text

Bateman (1998: 12-3):

Chapter 4 [pp159--270] turns to develop the ‘logic’ of English Text in terms of CONJUNCTION and CONTINUITY. This is the resource by which semantic messages are combined into larger complex messages, and through which messages are related to previously expressed messages as a text or dialogue unfolds. This is a rich and complex component of the discourse semantics and is essential for any adequate analysis of how texts ‘hang together’. System network classifications are given corresponding to all the major areas of ‘conjunctive cohesion’ discussed by Halliday and Hasan (1976), including subregions of addition, comparison, temporality and consequence, as well as further areas of CONTINUITY.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, "Martin's" CONJUNCTION and CONTINUITY are Halliday & Hasan's (1976) cohesive CONJUNCTION and CONTINUITY relocated from (non-structural) textual lexicogrammar to Martin's (structural) logical discourse semantics.  The theoretical inconsistencies created are thus both metafunctional and stratal.

[2] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that, though he has described a resource of the textual metafunction (relations between messages), Martin's model rebrands his relocation of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) model as a resource of the logical metafunction. 

[3] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that this "rich and complex" resource was theorised by Halliday & Hasan (1976) as a component of the lexicogrammar.

[4] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin's model is not theorised in terms of the three most general types of expansion: elaboration, extension and enhancement (Halliday 1985).  This creates mismatches between discourse semantic and grammatical descriptions, such that relations between the two are incongruent, without being metaphorical.

[5] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin's CONTINUITY mistakes

• mood Adjuncts of temporality for continuity items,
• mood Adjuncts of intensity for continuity items,
• substitution for continuity,
• circumstantial Adjuncts for continuity items.

For the detailed arguments on which all of the above assessments are made, see the clarifications and critiques here.

On Martin's Text Analysis And The Differences Between Identification And Negotiation

Bateman (1998: 12):

The chapter concludes with detailed analyses of two longer texts, both drawn from earlier research into the development of children’s narrative, a brief discussion of the relation between the circumstances of location and manner and discourse identification, and an orienting summary of the differences between IDENTIFICATION and NEGOTIATION as discussed in the previous chapter.

Blogger Comments:

[1] For some of the serious problems with Martin's analyses of texts [3:88] and [3:89], unnoticed by Bateman, see:

• The Analysis Of Text [3:88]: An Attempt To Hide A Theoretical Inconsistency
• Eight Problems With Martin's Six Notes To His Analysis Of Text [3:88]
• Eight Problems With Martin's Nine Notes To His Analysis Of Text [3:89]

[2] For 19 of the problems with Martin's 2-page discussion, unnoticed by Bateman, see:

• Confusing Circumstances Of Location With Demonstrative Reference Items
• Mistaking Manner For Extent And Confusing Circumstances With Comparative Reference Items

[3] For some of the theoretical misunderstandings and inconsistencies in the "orienting summary", unnoticed by Bateman, see:

• Metafunctional Inconsistencies
• Some Of The Theoretical Problems With Participant As The Entry Condition To The System Of Identification
• Misconstruing 'Multivariate' & Metafunctional Inconsistencies (1)
• Misconstruing 'Multivariate' & Metafunctional Inconsistencies (2)
• Martin's Insight That Interruptions Depend On There Being Something To Interrupt
• The Commonality Of Reference Structures And Negotiation Structures

On "Martin's" Instantial Reference

Bateman (1998: 12):

Two interesting further features of the analyses supported are the recognition of instantial reference [p144], where distinct reference chains may be brought together: ‘but he did not realise that it was his frog’, and some special properties of generic chains where the referring expressions refer to generic rather than specific entities [p103 and p145].

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, unknown to Bateman, Martin's 'instantial reference' is his misunderstanding of Hasan's (1984, 1985) 'instantial semblance', which is a type of lexical cohesion, not grammatical reference.  See A Misleading Analysis Of "Instantial Reference".

[2] To be clear, there is no conjoining of reference chains in the sample text ([3:84]).  Martin's false claim, accepted without question by Bateman, derives from confusing grammatical reference with lexical cohesion.  See A Misleading Analysis Of "Instantial Reference".

[3]  To be clear, Martin (1992: 103) defines the distinction between generic and specific reference distinction as: 

Generic reference is selected when the whole of some experiential class of participants is at stake rather than a specific manifestation of that class …

That is, though Martin labels the distinction as the elaborating relation of delicacy (generic vs specific), the definition confuses part-whole relations ('whole') with token-type relations ('manifestation of a class'), the former, the extending relation of composition, the latter, an elaborating relation of instantiation.  See The Re-Initiation Of Generic Reference Chains.

On The Manifestation Of Reference Chains In Lexicogrammar

Bateman (1998: 12):

The chains are neutral with respect to grammatical structure and semantic reference relations are always indicated (in contrast to Cohesion in English). The manifestation of these chains in the lexicogrammar is generally (i.e., congruently) within closed-class terms within the nominal group.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, leaving aside the fact that, as previously demonstrated, reference chains are not actually structures, Martin's reference chains are said to be the structural realisation of the textual system of IDENTIFICATION, the discourse semantic counterpart of grammatical reference.  Since grammatical reference is not realised structurally, there are no grammatical structures to realise its discourse semantic counterpart.

[2] To be clear, on the one hand, the source of most of Martin's ideas, Cohesion in English (Halliday & Hasan 1976), is concerned with grammatical reference, and on the other hand, reference chains do not feature in their work.  Martin takes the idea of reference chains from the notion of cohesive chains in Hasan (1985/9: 84).

[3] This misrepresents Martin's model.  In terms of the grammar, it is nominal groups that are said to be "phoric" and that are linked in reference chains.  This is because Martin's "reference" is actually ideational denotation ('participant identification'), not textual reference.

Moreover, it is not only "closed-class terms in the nominal group" that "manifest" these chains, since, Martin (1992: 99, 121) includes proper names as 'phoric', and according to Martin (1992: 135):

• the 'realisational domain' of reminding phoricity includes the Thing,
• the 'realisational domain' of relevance phoricity includes the Epithet,
• the 'realisational domain' of redundancy phoricity includes the Epithet, Classifier and Thing,

all of which can be realised by (open set) lexical items.

[4] This gloss of 'generally' misunderstands 'congruently'.  In SFL theory, 'congruence' refers to meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar) being in agreement, as is the case in the absence of ideational or interpersonal grammatical metaphor.

On 'Reminding Phoricity', 'Relevance Phoricity' And 'Bridging'

Bateman (1998: 11-2):

For capturing identification strategies, Martin sets out presumed elements as depending on presuming elements with the direction of dependence marked by an arrow linking the chain elements. ‘Reminding phoricity’ and ‘direct presumption’ are taken as unmarked cases and are not given any special indication, whereas ‘relevance phoricity’ (RL) and ‘bridging’ (BR) are marked as labels on the dependency lines connecting presuming to presumed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] A thought that did not occur to Bateman here is that presuming elements depend on presumed elements only in the sense that a reference item depends on there being a referent to refer to.

[2] A thought that did not occur to Bateman here is that "reminding phoricity" is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) personal and demonstrative co-reference, misunderstood and relocated from non-structural grammar (cohesion) to structural discourse semantics.  See Rebranding Co-Reference As 'Reminding Phoricity'.

[3] A thought that did not occur to Bateman here is that "relevance phoricity" is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) comparative reference, misunderstood and relocated from non-structural grammar (cohesion) to structural discourse semantics.  See Rebranding Comparative Reference As 'Relevance Phoricity'.

[4] A thought that did not occur to Bateman here is that Martin's "bridging" — taken from Havilland and Clark (1974) — is a confusion of two distinct types of cohesion: grammatical reference and lexical cohesion, relocated from non-structural grammar (cohesion) to structural discourse semantic system of IDENTIFICATION — the counterpart of reference.  See Confusing Grammatical Reference And Lexical Cohesion.

On Martin's Use Of The ‘Reticula’ Notation

Bateman (1998: 11):

Such [reference] chains reflect the sequential unfolding of a text; nominal groups related according to some selection of features from the IDENTIFICATION system networks are written in chains vertically down the page. This form of representation Martin derives from the ‘reticula’ notation for discourse analysis developed within the Hartford stratificationalist school (cf. Gleason, 1968).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Following Martin, Bateman here confuses what is purported to be a structure (reference chain) with the process of logogenesis (the unfolding of a text).

[2] One thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that nominal groups are lexicogrammatical form, not discourse semantic functions.  Another is that, in mistaking nominal groups for reference items, Martin's model links the participants the boy and his frog into the same reference chain (1992: 144).

[3] A thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that these reticula were devised to represent ideational meanings.  Martin (1992: 95):

These consisted of events and the connections between them (an event-line) and participants and the roles they play in events.

As previously demonstrated, Martin's model mistakes textual reference for ideational denotation, and so Martin's use of the reticula notation as a representational device is consistent with this misunderstanding.

On The Structural Description Of Identification: Reference Chains

Bateman (1998: 11):

For the structural description of IDENTIFICATION Martin turns directly to a covariate dependency structure for constructing reference chains.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Two thoughts that didn't occur to Bateman here are:

• even though grammatical reference is not a structural system, Martin models its semantic counterpart, IDENTIFICATION, as structural;
• Martin's system of IDENTIFICATION does not include any realisation statements that specify the structure of its unit, the participant (cf. systems of the clause).

[2] One thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that the notion of 'covariate structure' derives from Lemke (1985), who later (Lemke 1989) conceded that it is not a type of structure.  Martin lists Lemke (1989) in his list of references.  A second thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that, in SFL theory, dependency is a tactic relation between logically related forms (clauses, groups, etc.), not a relation of the textual metafunction between reference item and referent.

[3] A thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin's (1992) notion of 'reference chain' derives from Hasan's (1985/9: 83-5) notion of 'cohesive chain', which she applies to reference, ellipsis–&–substitution and lexical cohesion.

On Martin's Argument For Stratification

Bateman (1998: 11):

Some discourse semantic options are also realised by a range of grammatical elements, sometimes simultaneously. Generalisations such as these are also difficult to capture within the grammar alone—cf. Figure 3.13 and Martin’s (1997) own critical discussion of the DEIXIS system as suggested as a grammatical system by Halliday. Martin therefore concludes that the relationship between his networks for IDENTIFICATION and those for the nominal group lexicogrammar are indeed more reminiscent of inter-stratal relationships than of intra-stratal relationships since they clearly display ‘interlocking diversification’ (Lockwood, 1972), thus supporting the stratification.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the one hand, discourse semantic options, by definition, cannot be "captured within the grammar alone", since they are not grammatical options; semantics (meaning) and grammar (wording) are distinct levels of symbolic abstraction.  On the other hand, generalisation is modelled in SFL theory by the dimension of delicacy, not stratification.

[2] See the critique of Figure 3.13 here and of the argument Martin makes of it here.

[3] The thought that didn't occur to Bateman here is that Martin, in purporting to model 'reference as semantic choice' confuses the interpersonal deixis of the nominal group with the textual reference of non-structural cohesion, which is why he mistakenly "stratifies" the semantics of reference with regard to nominal group structure.

[4] Here Bateman reveals that, like Martin, he does not understand that the hierarchy of stratification is built on the principle of symbolic abstraction, whereby strata are related by the intensive identifying process of realisation.

On Martin's Claim That Discourse Semantics Can Turn Non-Participant Meanings Into Things By Referring To Them

Bateman (1998: 11): 

In addition, parallel to the grammar’s being able to turn non-participant meanings into participant-like ones through processes such as nominalisation, the discourse semantics can also turn non-participant meaning into ‘things’ by referring to pieces of text (e.g., who told you that, I can’t believe that).

Blogger Comments:

Some of the thoughts that didn't occur to Bateman here are that

1. Martin confuses the textual metafunction ('referring to pieces of text') with the ideational metafunction (construing non-participants as participants);
2. Martin confuses the textual cohesive function of that (anaphoric demonstrative co-reference) with its experiential clause structure functions (Verbiage/Phenomenon participants);
3. Textual reference does not "turn non-participant meaning into things";
4. Textual reference is a lexicogrammatical system.

For a critique of Martin's misunderstandings in this regard, see

• Confusing IdeationalConstrual With Textual Reference, and 
• Confusing Metafunctions And ConfusingTypes Of Cohesion.

On "Non-Referential" Nominal Groups

Bateman (1998: 11): 

Illustrations of these non-referential nominal groups include structural it, idioms, negation, and realisations for a range of grammatical functions such as Attribute, Range, Extent, and possessive Deictics.  There are also cases that Martin describes as “taking a single participant and splitting it in two’’ [p133], e.g., the top of the mountain where some facet of the whole is focused upon. The table on p134 sets out an overview of these kinds of incongruences in terms of the mismatch in participants and grammatical units.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's "non-referential nominal groups" are said to be 'non-referential' in the sense of not (ideationally) denoting meanings transcendent of semiotic systems.  In SFL theory, nominal groups do not (textually) refer, and the reference items within them, and within adverbial groups, do not function as such as structural elements of the group.

[2] See Martin's misunderstandings on structural it here.

[3] See Martin's misunderstandings on idioms here.

[4] See Martin's misunderstandings on negation here.

[5] See Martin's misunderstandings on Attribute here.

[6] See Martin's misunderstandings on Range here and here.

[7] See Martin's misunderstandings on Extent here.

[8] See Martin's misunderstandings on possessive Deictics here.

[9] See Martin's misunderstandings on Facet expressions here and here.

[10] See the critique of the table here.

[11] To be clear, in SFL theory, the term 'incongruence' refers to grammatical metaphor (where wordings are not congruent with meanings).  Grammatical metaphor is a genuine motivation for the stratal distinction between meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar).  However, Martin's examples are not cases of grammatical metaphor, if only because there are no congruent realisations with which to contrast them.  Moreover, if they had been cases of grammatical metaphor, Martin's argument would involve using ideational metaphor to justify a stratification of textual systems (discourse semantic IDENTIFICATION vs lexicogrammatical reference).

On Martin's Argument For "Stratifying Identification With Respect To Nominal Group Structure"

Bateman (1998: 11): 

These phenomena generally revolve again around cases of noncongruent relationships between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar. This was one of the general motivations for stratifying lexicogrammar and discourse semantics given in Chapter 1. ‘Noncongruent’ realisations involve Halliday’s notion of grammatical metaphor, whereby the lexicogrammar ‘repackages’ the information it expresses in diverse ways, as “variation in the expression of a given meaning’’ (IFG: p342). Applying this to IDENTIFICATION meanings, then, Martin claims [p129] that while all participants (semantic) are realised through nominal groups, it is not the case that all nominal groups realise participants.

Blogger Comments:

Here Bateman is reporting on Martin's theoretical justifications for stratifying his discourse semantic system of the textual metafunction, IDENTIFICATION, "with respect to nominal group structure".  Here are some of the thoughts that didn't occur to Bateman:

1. In order to demonstrate that the system of IDENTIFICATION is located on a higher stratum than the system of reference, Martin is looking at what he claims to be noncongruent (metaphorical) relations between units: between the proposed unstructured unit of IDENTIFICATION, the participant — the entry condition of IDENTIFICATION system Martin (1992: 129) — and the syntagmatic structure of a unit of form on the grammatical rank scale, the nominal group; and this despite the fact that the system of reference is not realised by any structure, let alone that of the nominal group.
2. Although purporting to be providing examples of incongruent (metaphorical) realisations of participants, Martin instead provides examples of mismatches between participants and nominal groups, which, if true, would be categorical, not metaphorical.
3. In purporting to provide examples of incongruent relations between participants and nominal groups, Martin, if correct, would be providing examples of ideational metaphor.  That is, Martin is purporting to use ideational metaphor to justify a stratal relation between systems of the textual metafunction (Martin glosses IDENTIFICATION as 'reference as semantic choice').  As previously explained, Martin's notion of 'participant' results from confusing the referent ('the participant tracked') with the system of referral.

On Martin's Identification Networks

Bateman (1998: 10-1):

Up until this point, it is not immediately obvious perhaps that the networks he presents are in fact discourse semantic and not grammatical: they certainly look rather similar to grammar systems for the nominal group that have been presented elsewhere. The example realisations given are also often single lexicalisations of structural elements of the nominal group, which reinforces the appearance of a grammatical statement rather than a discourse semantic one.  But Martin takes up this question explicitly and considers in closer detail a number of phenomena that favour the stratification that he claims holds between the discourse semantic networks and the networks of the nominal group within the lexicogrammar proper.

Blogger Comments:

[1] On the one hand, Martin's identification networks (Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9) bear no resemblance to nominal group systems, as a comparison with the following network (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 366) demonstrates:

On the other hand, nominal group systems are irrelevant to the semantics of grammatical reference since reference is not a system of the nominal group.  As previously explained, Martin's focus on the nominal group derives, in part, from his confusion of the interpersonal deixis of the nominal group with the cohesive system of textual reference and, in part, from his confusion of ideational denotation with textual reference.

[2] To be clear, Martin's argument is concerned with "stratifying" IDENTIFICATION 'with respect to nominal group structure'.  That is, Martin "stratifies" a discourse semantic system with respect to a grammatical structure, instead of a grammatical system, where the grammatical structure does not realise the semantic counterpart of grammatical reference.

For the arguments on which these criticisms are made, see the detailed examination of Martin's chapter on IDENTIFICATION here.