On The Importance Of Martin's Stratification For Grammatical Metaphor

Bateman (1998: 24): 

Two essential differences between these approaches [cognitive linguistics and mainstream syntax] and that pursued by Martin are, however, the following. First, for Martin both the strata involved contribute ‘meaning’—the lexicogrammar is not a passive, automatic reflex of semantics but itself also contributes meaning as was maintained in the original Firthian tradition out of which systemic-functional linguistics has grown. This is of particular importance when we come to consider the role and function of ‘grammatical metaphor’: i.e., what happens when the semantic and grammatical options taken up are not congruent. For Halliday (and thus Martin) a significant part of the power of language comes from the ability to cross-code grammar and semantics: grammar does not slavishly follow semantics, once a sufficient degree of language use sophistication has been achieved by a language user, the natural meanings of grammar can be used to construct extended semantic configurations: the best discussed example of this being, of course, nominalisation. Here a semantic event is turned into a ‘thing’ that can be modified, counted, compared, tracked across discourse, etc. Adoption of an ‘incongruent’ realisation for a semantic configuration thus necessarily adds further meanings to that configuration, since the incongruent realisation itself has (discourse) semantic consequences. This follows straightforwardly from a basic premise of the approach: i.e., that grammar and semantics stand in a natural relationship; the patterns of grammar are recapitulations of the patterns of semantics (and vice versa).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Unknown to Bateman, Martin's notion that 'all strata make meaning' confuses stratification (all strata) with semogenesis (make meaning); see, for example, Confusing Semogenesis And Stratification or Misconstruing Stratification.  This is one of the contributing factors to Martin locating (varieties of) language, register and genre, in context.  Moreover, lexicogrammar is neither 'active' nor 'passive' with regard to semantics; the two strata are two perspectives on the same phenomenon, linguistic content, at different levels of symbolic abstraction.  That is why the relation between them is one of intensive symbolic identity (realisation).

[2] To be clear, Martin's discourse semantics undermines the notion of grammatical metaphor by not providing congruent realisations of its systems by which metaphorical realisations can be recognised as incongruent.  Moreover Martin creates mismatches between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar — e.g. conjunctive relations — even in the absence of metaphor.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor does not involve using the grammar to construct 'extended semantic configurations'.  On the contrary, in ideational metaphor, for example, an 'extended semantic configuration' such a sequence is realised more compactly as a clause instead of a clause complex.

[4] To be clear, Martin does not understand grammatical metaphor (evidence here) and his meagre discussion of it is largely confined to nominalisation.

[5] This misunderstands grammatical metaphor.  The reason grammatical metaphor 'adds further meanings' is that it is the junction or fusion of the meanings of both the congruent and incongruent realisations; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 243-4, 272, 278, 283, 287).  Any discourse semantic "consequences" are a separate matter.

[6] To be clear, this is Halliday, not Martin.

[7] To be clear, in SFL theory, the patterns of grammar and semantics are patterns of instantiation during logogenesis, and the relation between them is realisation, not "recapitulation" (restatement, reiteration, repetition etc.). Here Bateman echoes Martin's confusion between instantiation (patterns) and syntagmatic relations (structural or cohesive).  See, for example, Confusing Instantiation With The Syntagmatic Axis.

On "Martin's" Solidary Relationship Between Grammar And Semantics

Bateman (1998: 24): 

Moreover, in certain respects, the approach in English Text also becomes more easily reconcilable, or at least, comparable, with many other approaches to grammar and semantics. Indeed, the position of a solidary, natural relationship between grammar and semantics has now become almost standard in many linguistic traditions: cognitive linguistics motivates linguistic forms on the basis of their ‘underlying’ cognitive structures (e.g., Langacker, 1987, Wierzbicka, 1988), the examination of ‘alternations’ in mainstream syntax posits semantic classes that explain differences in susceptibilities to undergo the various alternations in available constructions (Levin, 1993), even logical syntax has had syntax falling out of semantic structures for some time (e.g., Montague, 1974).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading.  The natural relationship between grammar and semantics is how SFL (Halliday 1985: xvii) models language.  Here Bateman gives the false impression that this is Martin's innovation — aided by Martin's Figure 1.12 (p20):

[2]  To be clear, the term 'solidary' actually means:

(of a group or community) characterised by solidarity or coincidence of interests.
e.g. a sociable and solidary regiment of some strength and purpose

On The Theoretical Value Of Martin's Stratification Of The Content Plane

Bateman (1998: 23-4):

The availability of the two strata, lexicogrammar and discourse semantics, is presented as beneficial in most areas that Martin addresses. The value of stratification, and of allowing the description to range across two (or more) strata, is argued in all of the areas that Martin addresses in English Text. The ability to distinguish systematically between a semantic unit and a range of possible grammatical units or patterns of such units is of fundamental importance—particularly given the very richly elaborated view of grammar assumed. Opening up the realisational relation between a semantic description and a grammatical description significantly empowers grammatical metaphor as an explanatory device.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading to the extent that it gives the false impression that the stratification of the content plane into lexicogrammar and semantics is Martin's proposal rather than Halliday's (whose considerably prior notion of grammatical metaphor depends on such a stratification).

[2] To be clear, Martin argues for the value of his stratification because it allows him to create his own "module" within SFL theory by rebranding his misunderstandings of others' work as his own systems:

• negotiation is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's speech function;
• identification is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's grammatical reference (and ellipsis-&-substitution);
• conjunction is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's grammatical conjunction; and
• ideation is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's lexical cohesion.

Martin's argument for stratification, however, presented in Chapter 1, does not survive close scrutiny; see, for example, Why The Argument For A 'Discourse' Semantic Stratum Is Invalid.

In brief, Martin provides three motivations for his stratification:

• semantic motifs
• grammatical metaphor
• cohesion

Of the three, only grammatical metaphor motivates a distinct semantic stratum, but this is Halliday's argument, not Martin's, and it does not motivate a specifically discourse semantics. Moreover, Martin misunderstands grammatical metaphor (evidence here), and reinterprets it as a process, a "texturing interface" (p401) between his discourse semantic systems and lexicogrammar (ellipsis-&substitution, Theme and collocation), thereby undermining his own argument for it as a motivation for stratification.

Of semantic motifs, Martin proposes (p16) setting up an attitude network to generalise what he sees as commonalities between some mental, behavioural and relational clauses.  For some of the misunderstandings involved, see The Problems With Semantic Motifs As A Motivation For Stratification.  Even so, no mention of semantic motifs is made beyond Chapter 1, and Martin's experiential system, ideation, does not address the points he raises — which is hardly surprising, given that it is a rebranding of a textual grammatical system, lexical cohesion.

Regarding cohesion as a motivation for stratification, Martin's argument involves misrepresenting the source of his ideas: Halliday & Hasan's (1976) model of cohesion.  See, for example:

• Misrepresenting Cohesion
• Misrepresenting The Domain Of Cohesion
• Misconstruing 'Cohesion Within The Sentence'
• Not Recognising The 'Continuity' Between Clause Taxis And Conjunctive Cohesion

[3] To be clear, Martin's discourse semantic units are:

• exchange and move (interpersonal system of negotiation)
• participant (textual system of identification — i.e. rebranded cohesive reference etc.)
• message (logical system of conjunction — i.e. rebranded cohesive conjunction), and
• message part (experiential system of ideation — i.e. rebranded lexical cohesion).

The problems here are with Martin's rebranding of cohesive systems. Most importantly, because Martin treats these non-structural systems as structural, the units he proposes are not units with internal structure, but units that relate to other units. This creates an inconsistency in the meaning of unit, since all other units in SFL theory are units with internal structure. So these discourse semantic units are not units in the same sense as lexicogrammatical units, such as clause, phrase and group.

Martin's naming of units further reveals his theoretical misunderstandings.  For example, the use of an experiential category, participant, for a textual system, identification, is consistent with his misunderstanding of textual reference with ideational denotation, as explained elsewhere on this blog.  On the other hand, Martin's use of textual categories, message and message part, for ideational systems, conjunction and ideation, is inconsistent with his own theorising, but (metafunctionally) consistent with the source of his ideas, the textual systems of cohesive conjunction and lexical cohesion.  Moreover, in naming the two message and message part, Martin misrepresents a relation of interdependency as one of composition (whole-part).

[4] This is very misleading indeed.  Firstly, as already mentioned, Martin does not understand grammatical metaphor (evidence here).  Secondly, Martin does not open up "the realisational relation between a semantic description and a grammatical description" since he provides no realisation statements that relate his discourse semantic systems to lexicogrammatical systems. Thirdly, because Martin does not specify congruent lexicogrammatical realisations of his discourse semantic systems, he provides no means of identifying congruent vs metaphorical realisations using his model.  That is, if anything, Martin's model undermines grammatical metaphor rather than "empowering" it — the direct opposite of Bateman's claim.

On Martin’s Explicit Modularisation Of The Linguistic System

Bateman (1998: 23):

The lack of neighbouring occupants at both more and less abstract levels of description with respect to ‘grammar’ has in the past allowed provided enough space for accounts of grammar to drift in both directions: thus we have, on the one hand, Hudson (e.g., Hudson, 1976) moving grammar to be less abstract, more form-bound and, on the other, Fawcett declaring that his system networks are in fact the semantic description of sentences, clauses, dialogues, etc.—syntax as such being restricted to the realisation statements. Martin’s explicit modularisation of the linguistic system into closely related but distinct strata places more overall constraint on the model presented.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, a grammar that takes form as its point of departure is not a functional grammar, in the systemic functional sense.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett misinterprets Halliday's grammatical networks as semantic in order to claim the level of form for his own model.  For evidence that Fawcett misinterprets Halliday, see the clarifying critiques here.

[3] Strictly speaking, in Fawcett's (2000) confused model (Figure 4, below), realisation statements are presented as potential at the level of form, and the structures that realise them are presented as instance at the level of form.

 

[4] To be clear, Martin's "modularisation of the linguistic system", like Fawcett's, is a serious misunderstanding of the dimensional architecture of SFL theory, and so leads to the serious misunderstandings found in their models (as demonstrated here for Martin, and here for Fawcett). Halliday & Webster (2009: 231):

In SFL language is described, or “modelled”, in terms of several dimensions, or parameters, which taken together define the “architecture” of language. These are

(i) the hierarchy of strata (context, semantics, lexicogrammar, phonology, phonetics; related by realisation);
(ii) the hierarchy of rank (e.g. clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme; related by composition);
(iii) the cline of instantiation (system to instance);
(iv) the cline of delicacy (least delicate to most delicate, or grossest to finest);
(v) the opposition of axis (paradigmatic and syntagmatic);
(vi) the organisation by metafunction (ideational (experiential, logical), interpersonal, textual).

See also:

• Misconstruing Strata And Metafunctions As Modules
• Misunderstanding Stratification
• Misconstruing Strata As Modules