On Semantic Motifs As Exemplifying "The Boundaries Of Grammatical Description"

Bateman (1998: 3):

The first example of reaching the boundaries of grammatical description that Martin discusses is the existence of ‘semantic motifs’ whose diversification in grammatical realisation goes beyond that which any grammar (even one such as IFG) should reasonably be required to cover. Patterns such as the following [p16] suggest that there are systematic choices available to the linguistic system for manipulating the grammatical potential (and its natural semantics) as it is employed in any text.

(a) Ford is smiling because Trillian arrived.

It pleases Ford that Trillian has arrived.

Ford is happy that Trillian has arrived. 

(b) Ford is frowning because Trillian has left.
It disturbs Ford that Trillian has left.
Ford is unhappy that Trillian has left.

The three sentences of both (a) and (b) range across what IFG describes as ‘behavioural’, ‘mental’, and ‘relational’ type clauses respectively. The grammar places these clause types in opposition: each involves a distinct ‘syndrome’ of grammatical constructions and phenomena and structurally they are quite diverse; here, however, they appear to stand as alternatives for, in some respects, semantically similar messages. Where, Martin asks, is this semantic commonality in apparent grammatical diversity to be located?

Blogger Comments:

What Martin (1992: 16) actually argues is as follows:

Following Halliday (1985), the first clause in each set is behavioural, the second mental and the third relational — fundamentally different process types. At the same time, all three clauses construct a relatively uniform, and not unfamiliar disposition for Ford. One way to generalise across these various realisations of the same disposition is to stratify the content plane, setting up an attitude network realised across process types (with realisations extending into other areas of the grammar as well; for example, adverbial and nominal groups). 

There are two major theoretical confusions here.

1. Martin uses generalisation as a justification for a higher level of symbolic abstraction.  This confuses one dimension of the theory, the scale of delicacy, with a distinct dimension of the theory, the hierarchy of stratification.
2. Martin proposes setting up an attitude network at the level of discourse semantics to be realised by process types at the level of lexicogrammar.  That is, Martin presents an incongruent (metaphorical) inter-stratal relation as a justification for strata in a congruent relation.

Moreover, despite using the notion of 'semantic motifs' as a justification for his discourse semantic stratum, Martin nowhere attempts to set up 'an attitude network realised across process types'.

See also The Problems With Semantic Motifs As A Motivation For Stratification.